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Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place:  
A New Approach to Agency Deference 
KEVIN O. LESKE 
In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. the United States Supreme 
Court held that federal courts must defer to an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation unless the interpretation “is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”  Astoundingly, despite its 
doctrinal significance and practical importance to our administrative 
state, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine has gone largely unexamined 
both by the legal community and by the Supreme Court, particularly when 
compared to the landmark deference doctrines announced in Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co. and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. 
This Article explores the genesis of this deference regime and analyzes 
the Supreme Court’s articulation, application, and interpretation of the 
Seminole Rock doctrine from its inception in 1945 to the present day.  The 
Article then proposes a new approach to the Seminole Rock doctrine.  
Under this new approach, courts would apply a two-step test to determine 
whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation.  By relying 
upon objective factors, thereby limiting the subjective inquiry, this new 
approach falls comfortably between Chevron’s controlling deference and 
Skidmore’s less deferential treatment that courts currently apply when 
reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision.  Such an 
approach would refine the deference regime to achieve better workability, 
greater fairness, transparency, and increased public participation.  It 
would also balance the competing regulatory and separation of powers 
concerns inherent in this critical deference question. 
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Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place:  
A New Approach to Agency Deference 
KEVIN O. LESKE∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over sixty-five years ago, in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,1 
the United States Supreme Court established a little-known yet crucially 
important administrative law doctrine.  In Seminole Rock, the Court held 
that federal courts must defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulation unless the interpretation “is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”2 Astoundingly, despite its doctrinal 
significance and practical importance to our administrative state, the 
Seminole Rock deference doctrine, which recently has been called “Auer 
deference,”3 has gone largely unexamined both by the legal community 
and by the Supreme Court, particularly when compared to the landmark 
deference doctrine announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.4 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law.  I would like to thank the 
Connecticut Law Review editors and staff for their excellent work on this Article.  I also am grateful to 
Professor Gil Kujovich, Vice Dean for Academic Affairs, of Vermont Law School, and Dean Leticia 
Diaz of Barry University School of Law for their support.  Special thanks go to my brother, Brian J. 
Leske, for his terrific comments and edits throughout the development of this Article.  I dedicate this 
Article to my parents, Doctors M. Cristina & Gary S. Leske, both extraordinary teachers and scholars, 
for their lifelong support and encouragement. 
1 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
2 Id. at 414.  
3 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).  Although Auer followed and, to some extent, 
elaborated on Seminole Rock, it remains a mystery why scholars and even some courts—including, 
most notably, the Supreme Court—have begun using Auer instead of Seminole Rock to describe the 
doctrine.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1089 n.26 
(2008) (observing and explaining Justice Scalia’s use of the term in his dissent in Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243, 277 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
4 See 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 
provision . . . really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable 
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.”); Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up 
Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 49, 99 (2000) (recognizing that Seminole Rock “has lurked beneath the surface and evaded 
scholarly and judicial criticism”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 696 (1996) (“Seminole Rock 
deference has not received anything like the attention devoted to Chevron, its more famous counterpart.  
But it is no less, and is arguably more, important to constitutional governance.”); see also 1 RICHARD J. 
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5 (4th ed. 2002) (observing the countless times 
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As several scholars have observed, there are myriad problems inherent 
in giving an agency this type of so-called “controlling” deference.5  As a 
theoretical matter, because the current Seminole Rock standard affords 
great deference to an agency’s interpretation, an agency has an incentive 
“to promulgate excessively vague legislative rules” and “leave the more 
difficult task of specification to the more flexible and unaccountable 
process of later ‘interpreting’ these open-ended regulations.”6  And the 
“more misty or vacuous the regulations, the broader is the discretion to 
interpret, and the less predictable will be the interpretations.”7  An agency 
can thus, in theory and in practice, expand its own power while at the same 
time avoiding the burdensome notice and comment process of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).8 
                                                                                                                          
Chevron has been cited by scholars and the courts); Melanie E. Walker, Comment, Congressional 
Intent and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1341, 1346 (1999) 
(“Chevron is one of the most widely discussed cases in academic literature.”).  In fact, a search of 
Chevron on June 30, 2013 returned over 7000 citing references in the Lexis “Law Reviews” database, 
while a similar search of Seminole Rock returned just over 260.  Restricted Shepard’s Summaries for 
Chevron and Seminole Rock, LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com (search “467 U.S. 837” in 
“Cases”; when Chevron decision appears, select “Shepardize”; then select “Citing Law Reviews, 
Treatises” at the top of the results page; then select “Law Reviews” from Content menu on left side of 
the page; repeat process, this time searching for “325 U.S. 410”); see also Walker, supra, at 1346 n.19 
(noting that a search of the Westlaw database returned 2912 secondary source citations to Chevron in 
1999); cf. Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The Deference 
Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587, 589 (1984) (“Although commentators have lavished attention on the 
subject of statutory construction, they have virtually ignored the problem of how to interpret 
regulations.”). 
5 I will refer to Seminole Rock deference as “controlling” deference because it conforms to the 
Court’s view that the agency’s “administrative interpretation[] . . . becomes of controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”  Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414; 
accord Weaver, supra note 4, at 591 (calling certain deference rules, including Seminole Rock’s, 
“controlling” because they are outcome determinative).  Other scholars have referred to it as “binding 
deference.”  See Manning, supra note 4, at 617 (discussing the concept of “binding deference,” which 
requires “a reviewing court to accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous legal texts, 
even when a court would construe those materials differently as a matter of first impression”). 
6 Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules, 
51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 290 (2000); see also Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The Court’s 
Deferences: A Foolish Inconsistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2000, at 10, 11 (observing that 
if an agency is confident that it will receive controlling deference for its interpretation, it creates “a 
powerful incentive for agencies to issue vague regulations, with the thought of creating the operative 
regulatory substance later through informal interpretations”). 
7 Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 11.  There is the added concern that these regulatory 
interpretations will be developed internally and issued informally, with no public notice or ability to 
challenge them in court, absent an adjudication for a violation of the regulation being interpreted.  See 
id. (“[T]he affected public will usually be unable to participate in shaping the informally-issued 
regulatory interpretations or to effectively challenge them in court.”). 
8 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); see Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. 
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1309 (2007) (“[T]he 
[Seminole Rock] doctrine may tempt agencies to issue vague regulations through the relatively 
burdensome notice-and-comment process”); see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 
525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue 
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The practical consequences of such a deference regime can therefore 
be enormous because most substantive legal rules defining private rights 
and obligations are created by agencies applying regulations, rather than by 
Congress directly passing statutes.9  For example: unaware of an agency’s 
changed interpretation of its regulation, a woman with five minor children 
lost benefits previously granted to her;10 a power company that relied on a 
previous interpretation of a Clean Air Act regulation was sued after the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) changed its view of that same 
regulation;11 and the new regulatory interpretation by the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers during a review of a Clean Water Act permit opened the door 
to the destruction of crucial headwater streams in Appalachia.12 
As a constitutional matter, the current Seminole Rock standard raises 
separation of powers concerns, a view most notably championed by 
Professor John F. Manning.13  By allowing an agency to resolve 
ambiguities it created in its own regulations, an agency has effectively 
been granted the power of “self-interpretation.”14  This power “contradicts 
a major premise of our constitutional scheme and of contemporary 
separation of powers case law—that a fusion of lawmaking and law-
exposition is especially dangerous to our liberties.”15  In Manning’s view, 
there must be a minimum amount of daylight between lawmaking and law 
interpretation in order to be consistent with the separation of powers 
                                                                                                                          
vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to 
make law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”). 
9 See Manning, supra note 4, at 614–15 (listing examples of agency-established regulations such 
as those seeking a civil penalty through an enforcement proceeding or adjudicating a claim for federal 
benefits). 
10 Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 433–34 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
11 Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
559, 566–67 (2006) (describing the “policy dispute over the meaning of ‘modification’ in the Clean Air 
Act” and arguing that “[i]t does not seem right to impose many billions of dollars of regulatory costs on 
firms for engaging in conduct that would not have been required under interpretations in effect either at 
the time the firms engaged in the conduct or at the present time”). 
12 See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 203 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(“[W]hatever the role of the headwater streams in overall wastershed ecology, the Corps is not required 
to differentiate between headwater and other stream types in the determination of mitigation 
measures.”). 
13 See Manning, supra note 4, at 638–39, 654 (discussing the relationship between Chevron and 
Seminole Rock and the “separation of lawmaking from law-exposition,” and applying a separation of 
powers analysis to the Seminole Rock decision).  Professor Manning also believes Seminole Rock 
deference warrants closer scrutiny because of its practical implications for administrative governance 
and the Court’s “movement away from deference to agency interpretations of law.”  Id. at 614–16. 
14 See id. at 655 (“The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock removes an important 
affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency can say what its own 
regulations mean (unless the agency’s view is plainly erroneous), the agency bears little, if any, risk of 
its own opacity or imprecision.”). 
15 Id. at 617. 
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doctrine.16  Controlling deference under the current Seminole Rock doctrine 
does not meet this requirement.17 
Compounding each of these problems—and providing a key 
justification for the new approach proposed herein—several noted scholars 
have voiced serious doctrinal concerns with the current Seminole Rock 
standard.  Professor Russell Weaver, for instance, observes that courts 
“have experienced great difficulty in interpreting regulations and applying 
the [Seminole Rock] deference rule to them.”18  He notes that even after 
Seminole Rock was decided, the Supreme Court has applied various 
deference standards and has “never adequately explained how they should 
be applied.”19  Many other legal scholars have likewise concluded that the 
amount of deference to be afforded to an agency interpreting its own 
regulation is ambiguous at best.20 
Building on Professor Weaver’s work, Professor Robert A. Anthony 
has further criticized the current Seminole Rock standard based on its 
conflict with many of the provisions and underlying goals of the APA.21  
He argues that by forcing courts to defer to agency interpretation, the 
Seminole Rock standard subverts the APA’s delegation to courts of 
determining “the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
                                                                                                                          
16 Id. at 618. 
17 See id. at 654–81 (discussing the questionable approach to separation of powers analysis 
utilized in Seminole Rock). 
18 Weaver, supra note 4, at 589.  As others in the legal community have noted, most of the 
scholarship on judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation “has emanated from the 
pen of Russell Weaver” starting in the 1980s.  Angstreich, supra note 4, at 67 n.70; see, e.g., Russell L. 
Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 109, 124–25 (1991) (discussing the 
different standards of the deference rule, which result in a varying level of review for each case); 
Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 
35, 36–38 (1991) (stating that “the courts have disagreed as to how the deference rules should be 
applied”); Russell L. Weaver, Evaluating Regulatory Interpretations: Individual Statements, 80 KY. 
L.J. 987, 987–88 n.3 (1991–1992) (stating that “[t]he Court has applied other standards as well,” with 
regard to the deference rule); Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: 
An Overview, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 681, 683–84 (1984) (discussing problems facing courts when 
interpreting agency regulations); Russell L. Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 411 (1992) 
(stating that the deference principles applied by the courts “were not always consistent with each 
other”). 
19 Weaver, supra note 4, at 592. 
20 See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1184 (“The amount of deference Seminole Rock 
requires has always been ambiguous, also contributing to doctrinal confusion for those lower courts and 
commentators who follow such matters.”); Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1307 (“[T]he Court 
has not clearly established the bounds of Seminole Rock deference.”). 
21 Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 9–10 (1996) (stating that “[t]he intent of . . . [section 706 of the APA requiring a 
reviewing court to determine the meaning of the terms of an agency action] manifestly was to arm 
affected persons with recourse to an independent judicial interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, 
where, after all, the agency is often an adverse party” and the role of the court is “a far cry” from pure 
deference to the agency).  
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action.”22  This abdication of the court’s role contradicts the APA’s 
purpose in giving “affected persons . . . recourse to an independent judicial 
interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, where, after all, the agency is 
often an adverse party.”23 
The limitations and shortcomings in the Seminole Rock deference 
regime have not gone unnoticed by members of the Supreme Court.  Over 
twenty years ago, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that Seminole Rock 
deference must not be “a license for an agency effectively to rewrite a 
regulation through interpretation.”24  And more recently, several members 
of the Supreme Court have questioned the Seminole Rock doctrine.  For 
example, Justice Clarence Thomas (joined by three colleagues) suggested 
that “agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected parties will 
have adequate notice concerning the agency’s understanding of the law.”25  
He opined that by allowing an agency to give “effect to such a hopelessly 
vague regulation, the Court disserves the very purpose behind the 
delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies, which is to 
‘resol[ve] . . . ambiguity in a statutory text.’”26  He also recognized that 
such authority undermines the notice and comment rulemaking process 
specifically embodied in the APA.27 
And even more recently, in 2011, Justice Scalia wrote a short 
concurring opinion specifically to highlight his newfound discomfort with 
the doctrine: “For while I have in the past uncritically accepted that rule, I 
have become increasingly doubtful of its validity.” 28  He then concluded 
by stating: “We have not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case.  
When we are, I will be receptive to doing so.”29  He soon amplified his 
criticism of the Seminole Rock doctrine in an opinion he wrote in the 
Court’s 2012–2013 Term, where he explicitly called for the rejection of the 
                                                                                                                          
22 Anthony, supra note 21, at 23 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)). 
23 Id. at 9.  Professor Anthony also contends that the Seminole Rock doctrine contradicts the 
APA’s purpose in allowing for an “exception for interpretative rules in § 553.”  Anthony & Asimow, 
supra note 6, at 11.  These rules should be subject to “plenary judicial review.”  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553). 
24 Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 170 (1987) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 
25 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
26 Id. at 518, 525 (alterations in original) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 
680, 696 (1991)); see also Manning, supra note 4, at 615–16 (recognizing Justice Thomas’s criticism 
of Seminole Rock’s underpinnings).  Thus, although controlling deference may on the one hand 
simplify judicial review, it “disserve[s] the interests of the affected public and of persons concerned 
with the fairness, efficiency and acceptability of governmental processes.”  Anthony & Asimow, supra 
note 6, at 11. 
27 Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
28 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
29 Id. 
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Seminole Rock/Auer deference doctrine.30  Justice Scalia’s opinion 
prompted Chief Justice Roberts to write separately, joined by Justice Alito, 
to make the Supreme Court bar “aware that there is some interest in 
reconsidering those cases.”31  
As a result of these numerous and substantial concerns, some scholars 
have argued that the Supreme Court should overrule Seminole Rock.  They 
claim an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation should be reviewed 
under the less deferential standard set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.32  
Under Skidmore, courts are directed to weigh an agency’s interpretation 
according to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”33  Applying such a standard, so their argument goes, would 
provide an independent judicial check that would be more faithful to the 
constitutionally required separation of powers.34  It also would purport to 
address the other concerns by helping remove the incentive to draft vague 
regulations.35 
Other scholars have reached the opposite conclusion.  They argue that 
the Court should reaffirm the Seminole Rock doctrine because “[t]he 
division of responsibility for statutory interpretation that Chevron 
formalized would be undermined if courts reviewed an agency’s informal 
regulatory interpretation under Skidmore.”36  Under this theory, courts 
cannot carry out Chevron’s mandate to defer to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language until it has determined the 
meaning of the regulation at issue.37  And if a court first rejects the 
                                                                                                                          
30 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
31 Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
32 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see Anthony, supra note 21, at 10 (advocating for a less deferential 
standard); Manning, supra note 4, at 618 (same). 
33 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
34 Manning, supra note 4, at 618–19. 
35 Anthony, supra note 21, at 11–12. 
36 Angstreich, supra note 4, at 59; accord Pierce, supra note 11, at 567–68 (suggesting that courts 
adopt the Auer deference standard).  In Chevron, the Court found that once Congress delegates 
rulemaking authority to an agency, courts generally must follow the agency’s regulations that have 
been promulgated under that grant of power, as well as to defer to the agency’s interpretation of 
statutory provisions it administers.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843–45 (1984).  The Chevron doctrine is discussed in more detail infra Part II.B.2.  At the time, 
Mr. Angstreich’s principal concern was that the Court’s recent decision in Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576, 577 (2000), which refused to extend Chevron deference to informal 
interpretations of statutes, foreshadowed the overruling of Seminole Rock deference for informal 
agency interpretations of regulations.  See Angstreich, supra note 4, at 57–58 (“[A] wholesale shift 
from Seminole Rock to Skidmore, and even the partial shift that would result from the Court’s using 
Christensen to overrule Auer’s holding . . . would undermine Chevron’s allocation of responsibility for 
statutory interpretation.”). 
37 Angstreich, supra note 4, at 58. 
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agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation under Skidmore, it 
would not approach the statutory interpretation question under Chevron 
from the perspective of the agency’s understanding of the regulation.38  
Thus, the court, rather than the agency, would assume the role of making 
policy decisions, which would be in contravention of one of Chevron’s key 
underlying rationales.39  Reaffirmation of Seminole Rock is consequently 
necessary to “shore up” Chevron deference.40 
Both of these competing views muster powerful arguments in support 
of their respective positions.  After careful consideration, I do not agree 
that the Seminole Rock standard should be completely abandoned and 
replaced with the Skidmore standard.  Nor do I agree, however, that the 
Seminole Rock standard should remain in its current form and reaffirmed 
by the Court.  Instead, I offer a new approach. 
A comprehensive analysis of the Court’s opinions that apply the 
Seminole Rock doctrine, as well as the various deference regimes, reveals 
three things.  First, substantial doctrinal inconsistency, even confusion, 
exists with respect to this deference question, particularly when an agency 
is interpreting its regulation informally.  Second, when the Court has 
invoked the Seminole Rock doctrine, it has engaged in a far more searching 
inquiry than the plain text of the standard would suggest.  And third, many 
of the factors actually considered by the Court in those opinions promote 
fair notice, consistency, and accountability in the administrative state, 
while muting concerns regarding unconstitutional agency “self-
interpretation” and a lack of an independent judicial check on the agency 
interpretation. 
My proposed approach to determine whether to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulation is a formal, clearly articulated, and relatively 
simple standard.  It incorporates many of the objective factors previously 
applied by the Court to the deference question, as well as traditional factors 
courts have looked to when approaching interpretative questions.  By 
relying upon objective factors, limiting the subjective inquiry, and erring, 
in a sense, on the side of the original Seminole Rock deference standard, 
this new approach would fall comfortably between Chevron’s controlling 
deference and Skidmore’s less deferential treatment that the courts apply 
when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory 
provision.41 
                                                                                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. (arguing that “Skidmore’s potential for undermining Chevron leads to a justification for 
Seminole Rock deference”).  In making his argument, Mr. Angstreich also staunchly defends Seminole 
Rock from the criticism that “it gives agencies too great an incentive to promulgate vague regulations, 
violates the Administrative Procedure Act, and is incompatible with the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers.”  Id. at 51. 
41 This new approach would recognize the justifications underlying both Chevron and Skidmore 
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This new approach to an old question would likewise address many of 
the concerns voiced over the past several decades by both scholars and 
various members of the Court.  It also has the benefit of being a pragmatic 
solution.  Indeed, given both the Court’s recent movement toward cabining 
agency deference and its understandable reluctance to overrule its 
precedent, a clarification and reformulation of the Seminole Rock deference 
regime in this manner would allow the Court to remain faithful to its 
current (yet evolving) deference principles without overruling Seminole 
Rock expressly. 
Part II of this Article begins by looking at the Court’s deference 
doctrines established under both Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and, forty years 
later, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.  A 
brief examination of these doctrines as they apply to an agency’s 
interpretation of federal statutes will be helpful in framing the separate but 
related question regarding an agency’s interpretation of its regulation. 
Part III examines the Court’s decision in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co. and explores the genesis of its deference regime.  Because the 
Court did not explain its justification in its opinion, this Part by necessity 
also discusses how the Court subsequently explained its rationale for the 
doctrine in other opinions. 
Part IV next analyzes the development and trends surrounding the 
Supreme Court’s articulation, application, and interpretation of the 
Seminole Rock doctrine from its inception to the present day.  This study 
shows that the Court has been somewhat inconsistent when applying the 
doctrine, thereby helping to contribute to the doctrinal confusion that 
currently exists.  In fact, since Seminole Rock was decided in 1945, this 
analysis shows that the Court has—at different times—ignored the 
standard,42 set forth differing articulations of the original standard,43 and 
                                                                                                                          
deference and require courts to approach the deference question with a degree of independence—which 
falls between these two doctrines.  The Chevron doctrine rests on the notion that Congress implicitly 
has delegated authority to the agency to interpret the statutory scheme.  See Pierce, supra note 11, at 
568 (discussing that the Chevron deference standard is based on constitutional principles where 
“politically unaccountable judges cannot overrule policy decisions made by politically accountable 
agencies”).  And although Chevron does not technically mandate “the courts to abdicate their 
responsibility for interpreting the law altogether,” when Chevron applies, the agency is granted 
controlling deference.  Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1249.  Thus, courts approach the inquiry 
with no real independent judgment and instead look simply to determine whether the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable.  See id. (“[U]nless circumstances otherwise suggest arbitrary or 
unreasonable behavior, reviewing courts are often wise to defer to an agency’s greater expertise, and 
sometimes, extensive interpretive efforts”).  The Skidmore doctrine, on the other hand, is primarily 
based on the Court’s respect for the agency’s experience and expertise, reflecting “a policy of judicial 
prudence.”  Id.  Courts are, however, granted some liberty to weigh subjective factors, such as “the 
thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration” and ultimately, its persuasiveness, in determining 
whether to defer.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  Thus, under Skidmore, courts 
wield more independent judgment when interpreting the regulation than under Chevron. 
42 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1103–04 (observing that the Court routinely failed to 
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introduced and incorporated different factors altogether in the standard.44 
Finally, Part V proposes a new approach to the Seminole Rock 
doctrine.  Under this new approach, courts would apply a straightforward 
two-step test to determine whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of 
its regulation.  First, as is done when applying the familiar Chevron 
deference test, courts would determine whether the regulation is 
unambiguous.  If the regulation is unambiguous, then the court’s inquiry 
naturally would end because it is axiomatic that an agency must follow the 
plain language of its regulations.  Second, if the regulation is ambiguous, 
courts would look to four factors to resolve the deference question: (1) the 
agency’s stated intent when the regulation was promulgated; (2) whether 
the interpretation had been consistently held by the agency; (3) in what 
format the interpretation appears; and (4) whether the regulation being 
interpreted “parrots” or otherwise restates the statutory text (whereby the 
agency’s view is actually statutory interpretation masquerading as 
regulatory interpretation). 
II.  A DEFERENTIAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Introduction 
Like any law review article examining a jurisprudential doctrine that 
has spanned six decades, this Article cannot turn over every rock.  Thus, 
before turning to the Court’s deference doctrines, it is necessary at the 
outset to take a moment to highlight what this Article does and does not 
do.  Several of these points may be fairly obvious; others, however, may be 
worthy of additional explanation. 
First, the issue presented here concerns an agency’s interpretation of its 
regulation, and not its governing statute.  The latter case, of course, is 
governed by Chevron’s deference regime, as will be re-introduced below.  
To be sure, agency regulations have their origin in federal statutes by 
embodying the Congressional delegation of authority to administer those 
statutes.  But more often than not, Congress grants agencies broad power 
and expects them to make difficult and complex policy choices that 
                                                                                                                          
apply Seminole Rock). 
43 See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 706 (1991) (giving the agency 
“deference so long as [its interpretation] is reasonable”); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991) (giving the agency “substantial deference”); Ehlert v. 
United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (recognizing that deference is appropriate for “reasonable” and 
“consistently applied” interpretations). 
44 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (indicating that an interpretation of a 
parroting regulation is not eligible for Seminole Rock deference); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 
512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (requiring deference unless an “alternative reading is compelled by the 
regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the 
regulation’s promulgation” (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988))). 
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Congress was not willing to make or that it entrusted to agencies. 
The task of “administering a statute” is accomplished by the agency in 
many ways, including through the promulgation of regulations and the 
accompanying interpretation of those regulations.  Naturally, these 
interpretations, whether an interpretation of the statute or the regulation, 
can be “expressed in a great variety of forms—in legislative regulations, 
adjudicatory opinions, manuals, court briefs, interpretive rules, policy 
statements, staff instructions, opinion letters, audits, correspondence, 
informal advice, guidelines, press releases, testimony before Congress, 
internal memoranda, speeches, explanatory statements in the Federal 
Register, and others.”45  And particularly since these less formal means of 
interpreting regulations now dominate the administrative state and 
effectively have the force of law by essentially defining the legal rights and 
obligations of the public, the particular deference question addressed 
herein is (ironically) far from academic.46 
Next, given that the Seminole Rock doctrine has not been explored to 
nearly the degree of many of the other deference doctrines, there are a 
plethora of unresolved questions in this area.  These include: 
• how and to what extent Chevron applies when, in addition 
to challenging the agency’s interpretation of the 
regulation under Seminole Rock, a party challenges the 
validity of the regulation as interpreted by the agency 
under the statute;47 
• why the Supreme Court routinely declines to invoke the 
Seminole Rock doctrine despite its applicability to the 
case before it;48 and 
                                                                                                                          
45 Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 (1990). 
46 For the most part, this Article does not distinguish among the various specific informal manners 
in which an agency expresses its interpretation of its regulation.  To be sure, the format is important 
and ought to be considered when resolving the deference question.  In fact, this factor is considered as 
part of the proposed new approach discussed herein.  See infra Part V. 
47 The few scholars who have explored Seminole Rock deference have reached different 
conclusions on this issue.  Mr. Angstreich, for example, maintains that the application of Seminole 
Rock deference “will be a prelude to the Chevron two-step, because the output of applying Seminole 
Rock deference is an input in the application of Chevron deference.”  Angstreich, supra note 4, at 73.  
In other words, under his view, courts must first interpret the regulation (or decide whether or not to 
defer to the agency in its interpretation) under Seminole Rock before deciding whether the 
interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute under Chevron.  Professor Manning, on the other 
hand, is of the view that “to get to Seminole Rock deference, a court must first address the 
straightforward Chevron question whether an agency regulation, as interpreted, violates the statute.”  
Manning, supra note 4, at 627 n.78. 
48 Professor Eskridge and Ms. Baer have conducted an empirical study of cases where the 
Supreme Court addressed agency interpretations.  Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1089–90.  The 
study and data extended to cases in which Seminole Rock was applicable—whether that specific 
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• whether the Court should extend its holding in United 
States v. Mead Corp.49 (that an agency’s informal 
statutory interpretation is only subject to Skidmore 
deference) to an agency’s informal interpretation of its 
regulation.50 
In general, the questions involving the specific interplay between 
Chevron and Seminole Rock are beyond the scope of this particular Article.  
Moreover, because agencies are often provided with significant leeway 
and, often times, very few limitations from Congress as how to achieve the 
statutory goal, the applicability of Chevron deference is not necessarily at 
issue in these types of cases.  In other words, in most of the cases where a 
court is determining whether to accept an agency’s interpretation of its 
regulation, both the agency’s proffered interpretation and the many other 
alternate interpretations, such as those advanced by a challenger, would be 
a reasonable interpretation of the statute under Chevron.  And the focus of 
the Seminole Rock inquiry is one of regulatory construction to determine 
what an ambiguous regulation actually means—not the subsequent 
question of whether that meaning is consistent with the statute.  Nor does 
the underlying justification, if there is one, for the Court’s decision not to 
invoke Seminole Rock resolve the question presented by this Article, 
namely, whether there is an alternative approach to determine whether and 
to what extent a court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of its 
regulation.51 
Having stated what this Article does not do, it should be explained 
what this Article does do.  This Article’s primary focus is to examine the 
Supreme Court cases that actually applied the Seminole Rock doctrine from 
its inception in 1945 to the present day, with an emphasis on the factors the 
Court relied upon in reaching its deference decision.  From that analysis 
                                                                                                                          
doctrine was invoked by the Court or not—and documented whether the Court ultimately agreed with 
or acquiesced in the agency’s interpretation.  Id. at 1120.  Professor Eskridge and Ms. Baer concluded 
that the Court invoked Seminole Rock—and several other deference regimes—“in a small minority of 
cases where [each of] those regimes were applicable.”  Id. 
49 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
50 See id. at 221 (“[U]nder Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the [tariff classification] ruling [by the U.S. 
Customs Service] is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness.” (citation omitted)); see 
also Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 10–11 (discussing the holding of Christensen and the 
adoption of informal agency interpretations). 
51 Of course, to the extent the Court is declining to invoke Seminole Rock due to its imprecise 
parameters, it would support the central goal of this Article, which calls for a clearly-articulated test.  
There is no data for this assumption, however.  As Professor Eskridge and Ms. Baer explain, the 
decision not to invoke Seminole Rock could be because the Court has other deference regime options, 
or otherwise prefers its ad hoc justifications in this area of law.  Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 
1104–05.  But given the confusion and inconsistency that currently exists in the Supreme Court’s own 
cases, see infra Part IV, a clear test would be important in this area, particularly for federal district and 
appellate courts faced with the deference question. 
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and those factors, it strives to construct and propose a clearly articulated 
deference standard that would improve the workability of the doctrine in 
this area.  In this way, this Article seeks to contribute in some small 
measure to the limited, but impressive, scholarship in this area. 
B.  A Brief Look at the Court’s Related Deference Doctrines 
Before turning to an examination of the Seminole Rock doctrine and its 
development through the years, this Part briefly visits the Supreme Court’s 
deference regimes for agency interpretations of statutory provisions.  The 
Court’s judicial deference doctrines in this area have evolved steadily over 
time in cases such as Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
National Resource Defense Council, Inc. Such cases “now function 
collectively as parts of a comprehensive framework for judicial review of 
administrative interpretations.”52 
Through these cases, the Court has established and refined distinct 
tests to determine the level of deference to afford an agency when 
interpreting a statute.  Although scholars have debated whether each 
approach represents a distinct deference doctrine or whether there is one 
comprehensive deference doctrine, for practical purposes, they can be 
categorized as a continuum of deference levels that courts will afford an 
agency.53  This continuum ranges from plenary review of an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute (no deference whatsoever), to an intermediate 
level of respect under Skidmore, to a controlling deference standard under 
Chevron.  The latter two are discussed below. 
1.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 
Until the Supreme Court decided Skidmore v. Swift & Co., its approach 
to what weight should be given to an agency interpretation lacked a 
cohesive, identifiable doctrine.54  Unlike its famous cousin, Chevron, the 
facts presented in Skidmore are not well known, and a brief summary will 
provide a colorful backdrop for this important development in 
                                                                                                                          
52 Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1239.   
53 Likewise, the Supreme Court appears to be divided on whether there is one deference doctrine 
or two.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 852 
(2001) (“The opinions in Christensen v. Harris County reveal a cleavage of views among the Justices 
on this issue.”).  The five Justices in the majority in Christensen recognized two deference doctrines, 
Chevron deference and Skidmore deference, while four Justices appear to believe that there is only one 
deference doctrine.  Id.  Of the four Justices that believe in one doctrine, Justice Scalia asserts that 
Chevron is the only deference doctrine, while Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer seem to believe 
that Chevron and Skidmore are separate manifestations of a single deference doctrine.  Id.  Because it is 
not critical to resolve this question for the purposes of this Article, I will refer to them as separate 
doctrines within a broader framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations.  See 
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1239 (discussing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s judicial 
deference doctrine following its decision in Skidmore). 
54 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). 
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administrative law. 
In Skidmore, seven members of the Swift & Co. packing plant in Fort 
Worth, Texas, sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to recover 
overtime pay.55  Swift & Co. engaged in a “general packing business, 
[which included] purchasing, handling, slaughtering, dressing, processing, 
selling and distributing livestock in interstate commerce.”56  The regular 
daytime work of several of the plaintiffs, including John Skidmore, was 
operating the company’s elevators at the plant.57  On some nights, 
however, one of them was required to remain in the fire hall (or within 
“hailing distance”) in order to respond to fire calls.58  For this extra work, 
they were paid between fifty and sixty-four cents for each call, which 
rarely took more than an hour to address.59  Thus, although responsible for 
fire calls, they were free to pursue “whatever pleasurable pursuits, or 
personal duties, they cared for.”60 
Skidmore and the others subsequently alleged that they were entitled to 
overtime pay for all the time that they were “on-call.”61  Although an 
Interpretive Bulletin by the Administrator of the Department of Labor 
suggested otherwise, the district court found for the company, compelled 
by its view that “pursuing such pleasurable occupations or performing such 
personal chores does not constitute work.”62  On appeal, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that “[c]ertainly 
plaintiffs [were] not entitled to recover overtime compensation for 
sleeping.”63  In doing so, the Fifth Circuit analogized the facts in the case 
to an example in the Interpretive Bulletin that it had concluded should 
apply.64 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Robert H. Jackson, in a 
unanimous opinion, reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision.65  He noted that 
Congress had vested responsibility to the court, not the agency, to “find 
facts and to determine in the first instance whether particular cases fall 
                                                                                                                          
55 Id. at 135. 
56 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 53 F. Supp. 1020, 1020 (N.D. Tex. 1942), aff’d 136 F.2d 112 (5th 
Cir. 1943), rev’d, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
57 Id. 
58 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135.  This fire hall was “equipped with steam heat and air-conditioned 
rooms” and with “sleeping quarters, a pool table, a domino table, and a radio.”  Id. at 136. 
59 Id. at 135–36.  They were paid fifty cents per call from the effective date of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act through January 1, 1940, and then sixty-four cents after that.  Skidmore, 53 F. Supp. at 
1020–21. 
60 Skidmore, 53 F. Supp. at 1020–21. 
61 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135. 
62 Skidmore, 53 F. Supp. at 1021. 
63 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 136 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1943). 
64 Id. 
65 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
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within or without the Act.”66  But this, he declared, did not obviate 
weighing the Administrator’s “considerable experience in the problems of 
ascertaining working time in employments involving periods of 
inactivity.”67 
The Skidmore Court observed that in both informal ruling and 
interpretive bulletins, the Administrator had determined that a “flexible 
solution” was called for in order to determine what specific time periods, if 
any, of the inactive “on-call” time should be counted.68  The Administrator 
also had opined in an amicus brief that although the precise facts of the 
case had not yet been addressed in the Bulletin, the general tests pointed to 
“the exclusion of sleeping and eating time of these employees from the 
workweek and the inclusion of all other on-call time.”69 
In the court’s opinion, Justice Jackson specifically noted that no 
statutory provision established the degree of deference to be given to the 
Administrator.70  Nonetheless, he recognized that because rulings, 
interpretations, and opinions are “are made in pursuance of official duty, 
based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case,” they 
were worthy of some respect.71  Thus, “while not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of their authority, [they] do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”72  Further, their weight would be determined 
according to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”73  Accordingly, the case was remanded to the district court for 
determination of what “waiting time,” if any, would be compensable.74 
For the next forty years, Skidmore “enjoyed prominence as perhaps the 
Supreme Court’s best expression of its policy of judicial deference toward 
many if not most agency interpretations of law.”75  Its ongoing vitality, 
however, was called into some doubt when the Supreme Court issued its 
landmark decision in Chevron. 
                                                                                                                          
66 Id. at 137. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 138. 
69 Id. at 139. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 140. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1236. 
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2.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
The basic facts and holding in Chevron are well known and will be 
only cursorily described here.  The Court in Chevron was called upon to 
determine the meaning of “stationary source” as that term was used in the 
Clean Air Act.76  Pursuant to the statute, the EPA promulgated a regulation 
that allowed states “to adopt a plantwide definition of the term ‘stationary 
source.’”77  This allowed a plant to install or modify particular pollution-
generating units at its facility without triggering onerous permit conditions 
so long as the change did not increase the total emissions from the plant.78  
The question, as framed by the Court, was whether the EPA’s decision to 
group all these pollution-generating units “as though they were encased 
within a single ‘bubble’ [was] based on a reasonable construction of the 
statutory term ‘stationary source.’”79 
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous 6–0 Court, 
concluded that the EPA’s regulation was reasonable, thereby rejecting the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s conclusion 
that the “bubble concept” conflicted with the Clean Air Act’s purpose to 
improve air quality.80  In the opinion, the Court established the familiar 
two-step test to analyze an agency’s interpretation of a statute administered 
by that agency.  Under the first step, a court looks to the statutory language 
to determine whether Congress has directly spoken on the question at 
issue.81  If the statute’s language is unambiguous, then the court’s inquiry 
is at an end, and the agency’s interpretation of the statutory provision is 
irrelevant.82  But if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court proceeds to 
a second step, where it determines whether the agency’s interpretation is 
“based on a permissible construction of the statute.”83  If the interpretation 
is reasonable, then the interpretation is controlling.84 
The Chevron Court specifically explained its justification for 
establishing a controlling deference standard for an agency’s interpretation 
of a statute it administers.  According to the Court, an agency is 
empowered to “fill the gap” through interpretation because Congress’s 
grant of rulemaking authority to the agency creates the presumption “to 
                                                                                                                          
76 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984) (citing 40 
C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i)–(ii) (1983)). 
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 See id. at 839, 841–42, 845 (concluding that the EPA’s use of the bubble concept was a 
reasonable policy choice).  Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O’Connor did not take part in the 
decision.  Id. at 839. 
81 Id. at 842. 
82 Id. at 842–43. 
83 Id. at 843. 
84 Id. at 843–44. 
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make all policy choices within its sphere of delegated authority.”85  
Because agencies possess greater political accountability than the courts,86 
and have unique expertise and experience to administer “technical and 
complex” regulatory programs,87 administrative agencies are in the best 
position to make these tough policy choices.88 
As demonstrated by its discussion in court opinions and legal 
scholarship, the Chevron test revolutionized the administrative state.  And, 
at least initially, Chevron’s standard, which accepts reasonable agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, was applied broadly to many types 
of agency interpretations of statutes.89  Although the Chevron deference 
regime continues to evolve,90 it remains one of the most significant 
doctrines in administrative law. 
III.  THE SEMINOLE ROCK STANDARD 
The Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co. announced a new standard under which courts must defer to an 
                                                                                                                          
85 Walker, supra note 4, at 1346–47. 
86 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make 
such policy choices . . . .”). 
87 Id.; Walker, supra note 4, at 1346–47. 
88 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (suggesting that an ambiguity or silence in the statute may have 
been a result of Congress’s inability “to forge a coalition on either side of the question”). 
89 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116–17 (1989) (finding that the Secretary of 
Labor’s view expressed in Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and subsequent regulation was entitled to 
Chevron deference); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844 (1986) 
(according Chevron deference to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s “long-held position 
that it has the power to take jurisdiction over counterclaims” in state reparation proceedings); Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438–39 (1986) (holding that the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation’s interpretation of a statutory provision was entitled to Chevron deference even 
though not contained in a regulation). 
90 For example, during the Supreme Court’s 2000–2001 Term, a pair of decisions dramatically 
altered the doctrine and at the same time brought new vitality to Skidmore.  In 2000, the Court decided 
Christensen v. Harris County, where it found that controlling deference under Chevron should not be 
afforded to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that was expressed in an informal format, such as an 
opinion letter.  529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).  The following year, the Court decided United States v. Mead 
Corp., where it similarly ruled a court should only grant an agency Chevron deference when the 
interpretation of a statute is authorized by Congress and carries with it the force of law.  See 533 U.S. 
218, 237 (2001) (“Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable where statutory circumstances indicate 
no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such authority was not 
invoked.”).  Taken together, these rulings mean that formal interpretations should be entitled to 
Chevron deference and informal interpretations should be reviewed under Skidmore.  Id.  Perhaps more 
importantly, however, and as some scholars were quick to observe, the decisions in Christensen and 
Mead raise a potential doctrinal inconsistency in the deference regimes that is not easily explained.  See 
Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 10 (“[The] Court repudiated strong deference for agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes contained in formats lacking the force of law, while apparently 
endorsing strong deference for agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations contained in such 
formats.”).  Although this question is beyond the scope of this Article, the Supreme Court may at some 
point have to reconcile this potential doctrinal inconsistency. 
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agency’s interpretation of its regulation unless it “is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”91  This Part begins by reviewing the 
background and legal ruling in Seminole Rock.  It next examines the legal 
justifications for granting controlling deference to an agency under the 
Seminole Rock doctrine, which was not adequately articulated by the Court 
until nearly fifty years later in two cases decided in the early 1990s. 
A.  Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 
The striking principle that a court must defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulation unless the interpretation “is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” had a modest beginning in a 
case decided in the midst of World War II.92  In Seminole Rock, the Court 
was called upon to determine the “the proper interpretation and application 
of certain provisions of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188” under the 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.93  The Act was enacted to curb 
wartime inflation, and the Maximum Price Regulation generally “brought 
the entire economy of the nation under price control.”94 
The “core” of the regulation at issue “was the requirement that each 
seller shall charge no more than the prices which he charged during the 
selected base period of March 1 to 31, 1942.”95  In January 1942, Seminole 
Rock & Sand “contracted to sell crushed stone to V. P. Loftis Co., a 
government contractor engaged in the construction of a government dam,” 
at $1.50 per ton, as needed.96  V. P. Loftis Co., however, could not use or 
store the stone until August 1942.97  At that time, Seminole Rock & Sand 
delivered crushed stone for the original contract price of $1.50 per ton.98  
In the interim, Seminole Rock & Sand had contracted with Seaboard Air 
Line Railway and subsequently delivered it crushed stone in March 1942 at 
a price of sixty cents per ton.99 
Seminole Rock & Sand later attempted to enter into additional 
contracts for crushed stone with Seaboard Air Line Railway for eighty 
cents and $1.00 per ton.100  Chester Bowles, the Administrator of the 
Office of Price Administration, then sought to enjoin Seminole Rock & 
Sand from selling at a price higher than sixty cents per ton.101  The lower 
                                                                                                                          
91 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
92 Id. at 413–14. 
93 Id. at 411. 
94 Id. at 413. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 412. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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court, however, found that Seminole Rock & Sand had not exceeded the 
highest price charged for its crushed stone during March 1942 and 
therefore had not violated the regulation.102  It found that $1.50 per ton was 
“the highest price charged by respondent during March, 1942, and that this 
ceiling price had not been exceeded.”103  The Fifth Circuit affirmed this 
decision.104 
On review to the Supreme Court, the issue for the Court was “to 
determine the highest price respondent charged for crushed stone” during 
the period in question, “within the meaning of Maximum Price Regulation 
No. 188.”105  The Court began by recognizing that the Administrator’s 
interpretation was only relevant “if the meaning of the words used [in the 
regulation] is in doubt.”106  Next, should any ambiguity exist, it found that 
“a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the 
regulation.”107  With little fanfare or further elaboration, the Court then 
announced the standard that was to apply: “[T]he ultimate criterion is the 
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless 
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”108 
After reviewing the regulation’s language, the Court found that, 
irrespective of existing contracts for a higher price, the highest price of an 
actual delivery during March 1942 established the price ceiling.109  And 
“[a]ny doubts concerning this interpretation . . . [were] removed by 
reference to the administrative construction” of the regulation.110  The 
Court relied on a bulletin issued at the time the Maximum Price Regulation 
was issued, which had been made available to retailers and wholesalers.111  
Thus, the Court based its finding that the lower court erred on its own 
reading of the language of the regulation, as well as “the consistent 
administrative interpretation” set forth in the Bulletin regarding the 
ambiguous phrase “highest price charged during March, 1942.”112  And in 
reaching its conclusion, the Court placed considerable weight on the fact 
that other parties had been placed on notice of this consistent 
interpretation.113  Overall, the Court performed a much more searching 
inquiry to ascertain the meaning of the regulation than the plain language 
of the test it purported to apply.  In fact, it was only after it largely 
                                                                                                                          
102 Id. at 412–13. 
103 Id. at 413. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 414. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 415–16. 
110 Id. at 417. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 418. 
113 Id. at 417–18. 
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completed its own interpretive review of the regulation did it look to the 
agency’s view to remove “[a]ny doubts concerning [the Court’s] 
interpretation” of the Maximum Price Regulation.114 
B.  A Doctrinal Explanation of Seminole Rock 
The Court in Seminole Rock did not provide an explicit justification for 
why an agency’s interpretation of its regulation should receive controlling 
deference unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.  In 
two cases decided in the early 1990s, however, the Court shed some light 
on the justification for the doctrine.  In Martin v. Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission,115 the Court suggested that, like Chevron, 
Seminole Rock deference is based on the agency’s delegated lawmaking 
powers.116  And in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,117 the Court observed 
that Congress’s delegation necessarily entails the authority to interpret 
regulations and that this congressional delegation provides the basis for 
judicial deference.118 
In Martin, the Court considered “the question to whom should a 
reviewing court defer when the Secretary of Labor and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission furnish reasonable but conflicting 
interpretations of an ambiguous regulation promulgated by the Secretary 
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.”119  On review, the 
Supreme Court did not cite the Seminole Rock standard that an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation should be upheld unless “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”120  Rather, it merely stated 
that it “is well established that an agency’s construction of its own 
regulations is entitled to substantial deference.”121 
Specifically, it stated: “Because applying an agency’s regulation to 
complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique 
expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power 
authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the 
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”122  Thus, the Court found that an 
agency interpreting its own regulation was a “component” of Congress’s 
delegation of lawmaking powers to an agency. 
                                                                                                                          
114 Id. at 417. 
115 499 U.S. 144 (1991). 
116 Id. at 151. 
117 501 U.S. 680 (1991). 
118 Id. at 698. 
119 Martin, 499 U.S. at 146 (citing Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 651 (1988)). 
120 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
121 Martin, 499 U.S. at 150 (quoting Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
122 Id. at 151 (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566, 568 (1980)). 
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That same year, the Court similarly noted in Pauley v. BethEnergy 
Mines that controlling deference was a product of the same rationale as the 
Chevron doctrine: 
As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary’s authority to 
promulgate interim regulations “not . . . more restrictive 
than” the HEW interim regulations necessarily entails the 
authority to interpret HEW’s regulations and the discretion to 
promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable 
interpretation thereof.  From this congressional delegation 
derives the Secretary’s entitlement to judicial deference.123 
These decisions suggest that Seminole Rock deference is similarly 
grounded in an implicit delegation from Congress.  And this doctrinal 
underpinning will have implications in Part IV, when proposing the proper 
level of deference to be accorded to the interpretation of regulations. 
IV.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEMINOLE ROCK DOCTRINE  
With this framework now firmly in place, this Part explores the major 
cases where the Court has invoked the Seminole Rock doctrine.124  This 
analysis discusses the varied articulations of the standard employed by the 
Court over the past sixty years.  It shows that, despite the lack of explicit 
factors set forth in the Seminole Rock standard, the Court has consistently 
considered certain issues when applying the standard.  These include, most 
prominently, whether the agency’s interpretation has been consistent over 
time, whether the agency stated a contrary intent when it originally 
promulgated the regulation, and the format in which the agency has 
expressed its interpretation.125 
Since the Court’s decision in Seminole Rock in 1945, members of the 
Court have cited it nearly thirty times for the general proposition that the 
agency’s interpretation is to be given “controlling weight unless it is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”126  But even so, the 
                                                                                                                          
123 501 U.S. 680, 698 (1991) (alteration in original); see also Angstreich, supra note 4, at 96–99 
(suggesting that the Court in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998), 
adopted a background principle that the controlling deference to agency interpretation of its regulations 
is a necessary component to its authority to promulgate regulations). 
124 The Court has confronted the issue of an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation in many 
cases where it did not explicitly rely upon or invoke Seminole Rock.  See supra note 42.  The benefit of 
an examination where Seminole Rock was actually invoked is to allow an analysis of the factors and 
considerations the Court deemed worthy of explicit consideration and of the development of the 
doctrine as a whole, as expressed and applied by the Court. 
125 These factors become the basis of a new approach proposed in Part V. 
126 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 
U.S. 243, 284 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ballard v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 544 U.S. 40, 70 
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); Allentown 
Mack Sales & Serv., 522 U.S. at 390 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 
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Court has set forth differing articulations of the Seminole Rock doctrine.  
These cases have been analyzed and categorized below according to 
several general trends. 
These categories show that, in a sense, the Court has come full circle.  
Its approach to the deference question began with an expressed standard 
that suggested an almost unbridled respect for the agency’s interpretation 
of its regulation.  And while the Court struggled over decades to strike a 
balance between deference and accountability, it ultimately reached 
approximately the same place from which it departed: an agency’s 
interpretation of a regulation will carry the day unless it is plainly 
erroneous, with little real regard for such considerations as the agency’s 
stated intent when promulgating the regulation, its prior interpretation on 
that regulation, or the manner in which that interpretation has been 
expressed.  But this too, may soon change again due to the Court’s recent 
and new found interest in the doctrine. 
A.  The Early Years (1945–1970) 
Although Seminole Rock was decided in 1945, its standard was not 
cited by the Supreme Court until 1955 in Peters v. Hobby.127  And even in 
that opinion, it appeared only in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stanley 
Reed and was cited without any analysis or specifics with respect to its 
standard. 
In Peters, the Court reviewed the petitioner’s assertion that his 
“removal and debarment from federal employment were invalid.”128  At 
                                                                                                                          
(1997); Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186, 201 (1996); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 
U.S. 87, 103 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 
(1994); id. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich 
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 297 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting); Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 511 U.S. 
431, 436 (1994); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993); Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring); Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office 
of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987); id. at 170 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Jean v. 
Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 865 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 589 
(1981) (White, J., dissenting); Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U.S. at 566; United States v. Larionoff, 431 
U.S. 864, 872 (1977); N. Ind. Pub. Ser. Co. v. Porter Cnty. Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of 
Am., Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971); United States v. 
Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of 
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965); Peters v. Hobby, 349 
U.S. 331, 355 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting); see also Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. 
Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 295–96 (2009) (citing Auer); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 
(2008) (same); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672 (2007) 
(same); Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171 (2007) (same). 
127 Peters, 349 U.S. at 355 (Reed, J., dissenting).  A citation to Seminole Rock first appeared in 
1946 in M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, but it was relied upon for the general proposition that 
challenges to the Price Administrator’s authority under the Emergency Price Control Act must “be 
raised initially in a proceeding before the Emergency Court of Appeals.”  327 U.S. 614, 622 (1946). 
128 Peters, 349 U.S. at 333.  Dr. John P. Peters was a professor of medicine at Yale University and 
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issue was an interpretation by the Board of Inquiry on Employee Loyalty 
of the Federal Security Agency.129  Justice Reed cited Seminole Rock 
(along with several other cases) in his dissent: “Such reasonable 
interpretation promptly adopted and long-continued by the President and 
the Board should be respected by the courts.  That has been judicial 
practice heretofore.”130  Despite not quoting the precise standard language 
of Seminole Rock, his invocation of the case is noteworthy because he 
considered that it was significant that the Board’s interpretation had been 
“promptly adopted” and the agency had adhered to this view over time.131 
It was another ten years before Seminole Rock appeared again—this 
time in a majority opinion.  Thus, it took twenty years for the Seminole 
Rock standard to be relied upon by a majority of the Justices.  In its 1965 
decision in Udall v. Tallman,132 the Court reviewed “the effect of 
Executive Order No. 8979 and Public Land Order No. 487 upon the 
Secretary of the Interior’s authority to issue oil and gas leases.”133  The 
respondents challenged the decision by the Secretary to award 
approximately 25,000 acres in the Kenai National Moose Range in Alaska 
to a different set of parties.134  According to the respondents, although 
these other parties had filed their applications earlier, those applications 
were premature because the lands in question were not eligible to be leased 
because of the land’s status as a wildlife refuge.135  In granting the leases to 
the original lessees, the Secretary construed both the executive order and 
his land order to provide no bar to oil and gas leases on lands that had been 
designated as wildlife refuges, such as the Moose Range.136 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit determined that the executive order in question (which had created 
the Moose Range) and the subsequent public land order “had withdrawn 
the lands in controversy from availability under the Mineral Leasing Act, 
and that the lands remained closed to leasing until they were reopened by a 
revised departmental regulation.”137  Therefore, the court concluded that 
the applications of the prior parties were ineffective, and the leases that had 
been originally issued to them were void.138 
                                                                                                                          
was employed as a Special Consultant in the United States Public Health Service of the Federal 
Security Agency.  Id. 
129 Id. at 333–34. 
130 Id. at 355 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
131 Id.  
132 380 U.S. 1 (1965). 
133 Id. at 2. 
134 Id. at 2–3. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 4. 
137 Id. at 3. 
138 Id. 
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The Supreme Court reversed.139  In ruling for the original lessees, the 
Court cited Seminole Rock’s “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
standard.”140  But the Court’s analysis was much more extensive than one 
would have expected under such a deferential standard.  In fact, the Court 
devoted nearly twenty pages of its opinion to analysis of the Mineral 
Leasing Act, the applicable regulations, and even the legislative history of 
the Act.141  And of special significance to the Court was its view that the 
Secretary had “consistently construed” the orders at issue and that his 
“interpretation [had] been made a repeated matter of public record.”142  
Furthermore, the Court noted that, unlike the respondents, the original 
leases had “been developed in reliance upon the Secretary’s 
interpretation.”143 
The early years of the doctrine were thus notable not for what the 
Court did do, but rather for what it did not do.  In fact, two decades elapsed 
before a majority of the Court even applied the Seminole Rock doctrine in 
one of its cases.  Apart from its decision in Udall v. Tallman, where it 
considered both the consistency of the agency’s position and whether there 
had been reliance interests at stake,144 the Court merely cited to the case a 
handful of times with no real inquiry.145 
B.  The 1970s and 1980s:  Confusion and Inconsistency 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the opinions in which the Court cited 
Seminole Rock did not elaborate further on the standard or specify a precise 
analysis that was required.  This period generally can be characterized as 
one of doctrinal confusion and inconsistency. 
The first example is Ehlert v. United States.146  At issue in Ehlert was 
“whether a Selective Service local board must reopen the classification of a 
registrant who claims that his conscientious objection to war in any form 
crystallized between the mailing of his notice to report for induction and 
                                                                                                                          
139 Id. at 4. 
140 Id. at 17 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945)). 
141 Id. at 4–23. 
142 Id. at 4.  As the Court held nearly twenty years later in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), the Udall Court likewise found that “[t]he 
Secretary’s interpretation may not be the only one permitted by the language of the orders, but it is 
quite clearly a reasonable interpretation [and] courts must therefore respect it,” 380 U.S. at 4. 
143 Udall, 380 U.S. at 4. 
144 Id. 
145 See INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969) (“[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative 
interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation.” (alteration in original)); Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969) 
(same); see also United States v. Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (“We defer on this issue to the 
definition of ‘train’ given by the administrative agency which has oversight of the problem.”). 
146 402 U.S. 99 (1971). 
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his scheduled induction date.”147  The local board had refused to reopen 
William Ehlert’s classification because it found that his new anti-war view 
“did not constitute the ‘change in the registrant’s status resulting from 
circumstances over which the registrant had no control’” as required under 
a Selective Service regulation.148 
As it had done originally in Seminole Rock, the Court looked first to 
whether the regulation was ambiguous.149  Because “the meaning of the 
language [was] not free from doubt,” the Court found it was “obligated to 
regard as controlling a reasonable, consistently applied administrative 
interpretation if the Government’s be such.”150  It cited Seminole Rock for 
this standard.151 The Court concluded that “[t]he Government’s 
interpretation is a plausible construction of the language of the actual 
regulation, though admittedly not the only possible one.”152  Thus, at least 
in this case, the Court viewed the Seminole Rock standard to require an 
agency’s interpretation to be both “reasonable [and] consistently 
applied.”153 
A similar recharacterization of the Seminole Rock standard appeared 
several years later in Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Walton 
League.154  In that case, the Court again relied upon Seminole Rock, noting 
that the interpretation in question “sensibly conforms to the purpose and 
wording of the regulations.”155  The Court, however, repeated Ehlert’s 
formulation that controlling deference was appropriate only where the 
interpretation was “reasonable” and “consistently applied.”156 
This pattern of citing Seminole Rock, but articulating a slightly 
different standard than the original opinion, continued well into the next 
decade.157  For example, in reaching the conclusion that deference to the 
                                                                                                                          
147 Id. at 100. 
148 Id. (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971)). 
149 Id. at 104. 
150 Id. at 105. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 423 U.S. 12 (1975). 
155 Id. at 15. 
156 Id. (quoting Ehlert, 402 U.S. at 105). 
157 See, e.g., United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 589 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (“The 
[Internal Revenue] Service’s interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference.”); Ford Motor 
Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (“The Court has often repeated the general 
proposition that considerable respect is due [to] the interpretation given [a] statute by the officers or 
agency charged with its administration.  An agency’s construction of its own regulations has been 
regarded as especially due that respect.” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  In Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), the first post-Chevron case in 
which Seminole Rock appears, Justice Marshall observed in his dissent that “an agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulations is ‘of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation,’” Id. at 865 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 
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agency was warranted, the Court in Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs,158 stated that “the Secretary’s view is 
not only eminently reasonable but also is strongly supported by the fact 
that [the Department of] Labor wrote the regulation.”159  Quoting Seminole 
Rock, the Court recognized that the agency’s interpretation was “deserving 
of substantial deference unless it [was] plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.”160  But the Court noted in its analysis that the 
interpretation at issue “ha[d] been, with one exception, consistently 
maintained through Board decisions.”161 
Dissenting in Mullins Coal, Justice Marshall observed that the Court 
was “correct that the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is 
entitled to deference,” but he cautioned that “deference has its bounds” and 
that Seminole Rock deference was “not a license for an agency effectively 
to rewrite a regulation through interpretation.”162  In his view, the agency’s 
interpretation was “contrary to the plain language of the regulation, 
conflict[ed] with comments of the Secretary accompanying the final 
promulgation of the regulation, and create[d] an unnecessarily complex 
regulatory scheme.”163  Therefore, he viewed “the agency’s interpretation 
as plainly inconsistent with the regulatory language and history,” and 
would not have deferred as the majority was willing to do.164 
In this line of cases, the Court failed to cite Seminole Rock with 
precision.  Moreover, its analyses were not necessarily consistent with the 
precise standard it was applying, at least as it was originally announced.  
Nonetheless, the Justices did consistently consider several key factors—
including reasonableness and consistency—when applying the standard.  
In addition, Justice Marshall’s consideration of the agency’s original 
comments when it promulgated the regulation in his Mullins Coal dissent 
foreshadowed a new factor that the Court would explicitly adopt the 
following year. 
C. A New Standard:  Gardebring v. Jenkins and Thomas Jefferson  
University v. Shalala 
A significant change to the Seminole Rock standard emerged in 1988 in 
Gardebring v. Jenkins,165 a holding that was reaffirmed six years later in 
                                                                                                                          
U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 
158 484 U.S. 135 (1987). 
159 Id. at 159. 
160 Id. (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 170 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 485 U.S. 415 (1988).  In other cases throughout the remainder of the 1980s and beginning of 
the 1990s, the Court remained faithful to its original articulation of the Seminole Rock standard.  See, 
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Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala.166  In these two cases, the Court 
found that the Seminole Rock deference analysis required consideration of 
the original intent of the agency when it promulgated the regulation at 
issue. 
On review in Gardebring was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision that the Minnesota Department of Human Services 
(under Commissioner Sandra Gardebring) had violated a federal regulation 
issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).167  
The Eighth Circuit had found that in this case the regulation required that 
the agency give written notice to the respondent (Kathryn Jenkins) before 
suspending her benefits for a certain period of time.168  The Supreme Court 
disagreed.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens concluded that this “notice 
provision requires only that general program information be available, in 
‘written form’ and ‘orally as appropriate.’”169  Although conceding that “it 
would be wise (assuming that it were feasible and not too expensive) to 
precede every such change with adequate advance notice,” the Court found 
that the plain language of the regulation did “not unambiguously impose 
any such requirement on state welfare agencies.”170 
With respect to the lower court’s determination that the state agency 
was “required . . . to prepare a written notice that adequately explained the 
lump-sum policy and to distribute it to all current [aid] recipients and all 
future applicants,” the Court considered the view of the HHS Secretary.171  
The Court noted that the Secretary, who was responsible for enforcing the 
regulation, believed that “it [was] generally appropriate to rely on an oral 
explanation of the consequences of receiving a lump-sum payment when 
the recipient report[ed] it to the family’s caseworker.”172 
When determining whether to accept the federal agency’s 
interpretation, the Court recognized that “the Secretary had not taken a 
                                                                                                                          
e.g., Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 511 U.S. 431, 436 n.2 (1994) (adhering to Seminole Rock’s 
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” standard); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 
45 (1993) (same); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (same); see 
also Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 297 (1994) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that the “Department of Labor is entitled to ‘substantial deference’ in 
the interpretation of its own regulations,” so long as such interpretation is “reasonable in light of the 
regulations’ text and purpose”). 
166 512 U.S. 504 (1994). 
167 Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 417–18. 
168 An amendment to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program provided 
that “a family receiving nonrecurring lump-sum income” was ineligible for benefits for a certain time 
period after it received that payment.  Id. at 417 (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 42 
U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1982)). 
169 Id. at 429 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 233 (1987)). 
170 Id. at 429 n.15. 
171 Id. at 421, 429. 
172 Id. at 429. 
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position on this question until this litigation,” but the Court nonetheless 
deferred: 
[W]hen it is the Secretary’s regulation that we are construing, 
and when there is no claim in this Court that the regulation 
violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are 
properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the 
Secretary’s unless that alternative reading is compelled by 
the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the 
Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s 
promulgation.173 
This marked a significant change to the Court’s formulation of the 
Seminole Rock standard: a court must defer unless “the regulation’s plain 
language” dictates otherwise, or a different interpretation is compelled by 
“other indications” of an agency’s intent at the time it promulgated the 
regulation.174  Notably, seven Justices (including two in partial dissent) 
endorsed this formulation.175 
A separate opinion by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explicitly agreed 
with this new formulation.176  Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Brennan, 
however, “disagree[d] with the Court’s application” because the agency 
had taken “two inconsistent positions” during the litigation.177  Because she 
regarded the agency’s earlier position as “far more reasonable,” she would 
have held the agency to its “earlier and better interpretation.”178  Thus, 
these Justices viewed the fact that the agency had previously interpreted 
the regulation (presumably at the time of its promulgation) differently than 
it did during the litigation as dispositive.179 
Several years later in Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, the 
Court reinforced that the Gardebring standard represented an accurate 
formulation of the Seminole Rock standard.180  At issue in Thomas 
Jefferson University was a Medicare regulation that prohibited 
reimbursement of certain educational activities borne by hospitals.181  The 
HHS Secretary interpreted the regulation “to bar reimbursement of 
                                                                                                                          
173 Id. at 430.  Ms. Jenkins had not argued that the agency’s regulation, as interpreted by the 
agency, violated the statute or that it violated her constitutional rights, such as due process.  Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 416.  Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision in the case, and 
Justice Marshall only joined the last paragraph of Justice O’Connor’s opinion.  Id. at 432 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 432–33. 
178 Id. at 435. 
179 Id.  It is not clear from Justice O’Connor’s opinion whether the agency had indeed stated the 
“better” interpretation at the time that it had originally promulgated the regulation.  Id. 
180 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). 
181 Id. at 506 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1993)). 
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educational costs that were borne in prior years not by the requesting 
hospital, but by the hospital’s affiliated medical school.”182 
Although the Court initially phrased the question as “whether the 
Secretary’s interpretation is a reasonable construction of the regulatory 
language,” the Court quoted Seminole Rock and stated that the agency’s 
interpretation must be given “controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”183  The Court next repeated 
Gardebring’s formulation to explain the Seminole Rock standard: “In other 
words, we must defer to the Secretary’s interpretation unless an 
‘alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by 
other indications of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s 
promulgation.’”184 
In deferring to the Secretary, the Court found that the agency’s 
interpretation was “far more consistent” with the regulation than the 
petitioner’s interpretation.185  But the Court noted that it did not matter 
because “even if this were not so, the Secretary’s construction is, at the 
very least, a reasonable one, and we are required to afford it ‘controlling 
weight.’”186  Likewise, the Court rejected the argument that the 
interpretation should be rejected on the basis that it conflicted with a past 
interpretation.  The Court acknowledged that “it is true that an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior 
interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently 
held agency view.’”187  But it found that “because petitioner fail[ed] to 
present persuasive evidence that the Secretary ha[d] interpreted the anti-
redistribution provision in an inconsistent manner,” the maxim did not 
apply.188  A majority of the Court deferred to the agency’s interpretation.189  
Significantly, four Justices in dissent expressed their concern with the 
Seminole Rock doctrine and would not have deferred to the agency’s 
interpretation.190  Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, 
and Ginsburg, asserted that granting an agency the power to “self-
interpret” its own regulation was in stark tension with an agency’s 
responsibility to resolve statutory ambiguities.191  In Justice Thomas’s 
view, “the Secretary ha[d] merely replaced statutory ambiguity with 
                                                                                                                          
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 506, 512 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 
184 Id. at 512 (quoting Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 430). 
185 Id. at 515. 
186 Id. (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414). 
187 Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 518. 
190 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
191 Id. 
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regulatory ambiguity.”192  He opined that by giving “effect to such a 
hopelessly vague regulation, the Court disserves the very purpose behind 
the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies, which is to 
resol[ve] . . . ambiguity in a statutory text.”193 
Justice Thomas recognized that it was “perfectly understandable, of 
course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so 
maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make 
law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome 
rulemaking process.”194  But he warned that such authority undermines the 
notice and comment procedures in the APA: “[A]gency rules should be 
clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice 
concerning the agency’s understanding of the law.”195  Consequently, he 
would not have deferred and would have found that the Secretary’s 
interpretation violated the APA.196 
With the original stated intent of the agency now grafted onto the 
Seminole Rock standard—and with several members of the Court clearly 
anxious about the ramifications of controlling deference in these 
circumstances—Gardebring and Thomas Jefferson University reflected the 
appropriate test for courts to determine whether or not to defer to an 
agency interpreting its own regulation.197  This new “test,” however, was 
short lived. 
D.  Auer v. Robbins:  A Return to Seminole Rock’s Original Formulation 
In 1997, the Court reverted to its original formulation in Seminole 
Rock, eliminating any mention of the intent of the agency.  In Auer v. 
Robbins,198 the Court’s unanimous opinion displayed an open willingness 
to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation with no real 
inquiry as to factors considered by the Court in the prior two decades.199 
                                                                                                                          
192 Id. at 525. 
193 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 
(1991)). 
194 Id. 
195 Id.  Justice Thomas quoted Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce’s treatise on 
administrative law for analogous support.  See id. (“An agency whose powers are not limited either by 
meaningful statutory standards or . . . legislative rules poses a serious potential threat to liberty and to 
democracy.” (quoting 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 11.5 
(3d ed. 1994))). 
196 Id. at 529–30 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(a), (c), (g) (1993)). 
197 See also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108, 110–11 (1995) (O’Connor J., 
dissenting) (stating that although she took seriously the Court’s “obligation to defer to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of its own regulations, . . . . [a]n agency is bound by the regulations it 
promulgates and may not attempt to circumvent the amendment process through substantive changes 
recorded in an informal policy manual that are unsupported by the language of the regulation”). 
198 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
199 See id. at 461 (delineating that the deferential standard was met using the Secretary’s creation 
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At issue in Auer was the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of both 
statutory language and regulatory language.200  The petitioners, including 
Sergeant Francis Bernard Auer, were officers employed by the St. Louis 
Police Department.201  They brought suit against the St. Louis Board of 
Police Commissioners, including Commissioner David A. Robbins, for 
overtime pay that they alleged was owed to them under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).202 
The Board claimed that the officers were exempted from overtime pay 
eligibility because they were “bona fide executive, administrative, or 
professional” employees.203  Such employees are not eligible for overtime 
pay under the FLSA.204  In support of its view, the Board relied on a 
regulation issued by the Secretary of Labor.  This regulation set up a 
“salary-basis” test to determine whether a public-sector employee is a 
“bona fide” employee (i.e., a salaried employee) under the regulation.205  
Under the regulation: 
An employee will be considered to be paid “on a salary 
basis”. . . if under his employment agreement he regularly 
receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, 
a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his 
compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction 
because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work 
performed.206 
The Secretary interpreted this to mean that if an employee’s “compensation 
may ‘as a practical matter’ be adjusted in ways inconsistent with the test,” 
the employee is not “on salary” and thus is eligible for overtime pay.207 
The officers contended that their duties were not “of an executive, 
administrative, or professional nature.”208  And even if their duties were of 
such nature, they argued that, because their pay was subject to reduction 
for various disciplinary infractions related to the “quality or quantity” of 
their work, they were therefore not salaried employees under the salary-
basis test.209 
In determining whether the officers were salaried employees, the Court 
focused on whether “an employee’s pay is ‘subject to’ disciplinary or other 
                                                                                                                          
of the salary-basis test). 
200 Id. at 454. 
201 Id. at 455.  
202 Id.  
203 Id.  
204 Id. at 454. 
205 Id. at 455 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(f), 541.2(e), 541.3(e) (1996)). 
206 Id. (alterations in original) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)). 
207 Id. at 454–55. 
208 Id. at 455 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(a)–(e), 541.2(a)–(d), 541.3(a)–(d)). 
209 Id. 
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deductions whenever there exists a theoretical possibility of such 
deductions, or rather only when there is something more to suggest that the 
employee is actually vulnerable to having his pay reduced.”210  The 
officers argued that, according to their police manual, all department 
employees are theoretically subject to disciplinary deductions in pay, even 
including the sergeants; therefore, they are “subject to” such deductions 
and hence non-exempt under the FLSA.211 
At the request of the Court, the U.S. Solicitor General filed an amicus 
brief offering the Secretary of Labor’s view on the salary-basis test.212  
According to the Secretary, the salary-basis test denied exempt status to 
employees who are “covered by a policy that permits disciplinary or other 
deductions in pay ‘as a practical matter.’”213  Thus, “if there is either an 
actual practice of making such deductions or an employment policy that 
creates a ‘significant likelihood’ of such deductions,” then an employee did 
not have salaried status.214 
Relying on and directly quoting the Seminole Rock standard, the Court 
noted that “[b]ecause the salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary’s 
own regulations, his interpretation of it is . . . controlling unless ‘plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”215  Based on this 
deferential standard, the Court found the burden “easily met.”216  Indeed, 
citing both the American Heritage Dictionary and Webster’s New 
International Dictionary, the Court simply stated that the “critical phrase 
‘subject to’ comfortably bears the meaning the Secretary assigns.”217  
Because there was an actual practice, and no significant likelihood of such 
deductions, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.218 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Auer is important because it 
marked a return to prior cases where the Court engaged in a rather 
mechanical application of the Seminole Rock standard.219  The Court 
                                                                                                                          
210 Id. at 459 (emphases added). 
211 Id. at 455. 
212 Id. at 453, 461. 
213 Id. at 461. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) and 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 The Court’s decision is important for another reason.  The officers had protested that the 
Secretary’s interpretation of its regulation was presented during the litigation and in a legal brief, and 
therefore was not worthy of deference.  Id. at 464.  The Court, however, summarily ruled that the 
Secretary’s interpretation was not a “post hoc rationalization.”  Id. at 462 (quoting Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (internal brackets omitted)).  It simply stated: 
“There is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question.”  Id.  The Court provided no explanation or further 
reasoning for this conclusion. 
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declined to engage in a searching review of the Secretary’s interpretation.   
Nor did it determine whether there were other indications of the 
Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation that would 
compel a different view than the Secretary’s or any other factors such as 
whether it was consistently applied. 
E.  Gonzales v. Oregon:  A Brief Return to Intent 
In its 2006 decision in Gonzales v. Oregon,220 the Court briefly 
returned to its pre-Auer decisions where the Court performed a more 
searching inquiry into whether controlling deference was appropriate.221  
Moreover, it resurrected one factor previously applied in Gardebring and 
Thomas Jefferson University, and also created a new “exception” that 
limited when controlling deference is due under Seminole Rock. 
 At issue in Gonzales was whether the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA) authorized the U.S. Attorney General to “prohibit doctors from 
prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, 
notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure.”222  The Attorney 
General had issued an interpretive rule that addressed the implementation 
and enforcement of the CSA as it applied to the State of Oregon’s 
enactment of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA).223 
The United States argued that the interpretive rule was an elaboration 
of one of its regulations and therefore entitled to controlling deference 
under the Seminole Rock standard as elaborated upon in Auer.224  This 
interpretive rule, however, essentially parroted much of the statute: 
[A]ssisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” 
within the meaning of 21 CFR 1306.04 (2001), and that pre-
scribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled 
substances to assist suicide violates the Controlled 
Substances Act.  Such conduct by a physician registered to 
dispense controlled substances may “render his 
registration . . . inconsistent with the public interest” and 
therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation under 
                                                                                                                          
220 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
221 Id. at 249.  In the time between the Auer and Gonzales decisions, the Court cited to Auer 
twelve times.  Restricted Shepard’s Report for Auer v. Robbins, LEXIS ADVANCE, 
https://advance.lexis.com (search “519 U.S. 452” in “Cases”; when the Auer decision appears, select 
“Shepardize”; then select “Citing Decisions” at the top of the results page; then select “U.S. Supreme 
Court” from Court menu on left side of the page; then narrow timeline to 1997–2006).  Many were 
simply decisions remanding the case in light of Auer.  The other cases, as a general matter, remained 
faithful to the Auer formulation and analysis. 
222 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 248–49 (citing Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)). 
223 Id. at 249 (citing ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–127.990 (2003)). 
224 Id. at 256 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2005)). 
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21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4).225 
Although the Court recognized that “[a]n administrative rule may 
receive substantial deference if it interprets the issuing agency’s own 
ambiguous regulation,” it declined to extend that deference here.226  
Because the language addressed in the interpretive rule “comes from 
Congress, not the Attorney General,” the Court held that deference was not 
warranted.227 
More specifically, according to the Court, the rule’s repetition of 
statutory phrases, such as “legitimate medical purpose” and “in the course 
of professional practice,” shed no light on “a central issue in this case: 
Who decides whether a particular activity is in ‘the course of professional 
practice’ or done for a ‘legitimate medical purpose’?”228  Therefore, 
because “the regulation gives no indication how to decide this issue, the 
Attorney General’s effort to decide it now” through his interpretive rule 
“cannot be considered an interpretation of the regulation.”229  Summing up, 
the Court observed that “[a]n agency does not acquire special authority to 
interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience 
to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory 
language.”230  And, “[s]imply put, the existence of a parroting regulation 
does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the 
regulation but the meaning of the statute.”231  This holding thus established 
the aptly-named “anti-parroting” exception to Seminole Rock deference.232 
And if these were not reasons enough, the Court offered another for its 
conclusion.  Because the Attorney General’s current interpretation could 
not “be justified as indicative of some intent the Attorney General had in 
1971” when the regulation was promulgated, the Court also found 
deference was not in order.233  In fact, quoting Thomas Jefferson 
                                                                                                                          
225 Id. at 254 (alterations in original); see 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (2006) (explaining how the 
Attorney General may deny, suspend, or revoke a physician’s registration if it is “inconsistent with the 
public interest”).  
226 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997)).  
227 Id. at 257; see Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (but for How Long?): Justice 
Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 32 
(2007) (explaining the evolution of various levels of deference afforded by the Court to administrative 
agencies). 
228 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257. 
229 Id. 
230 Id.  
231 Id. 
232 Id.  Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, dissented.  Relying 
heavily upon the Seminole Rock standard, they argued that the Attorney General’s interpretation was 
“clearly valid, given the substantial deference [the Court] must accord it.”  Id. at 275 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  They also questioned the majority’s creation of the exception for interpretations that 
merely “restate the terms of the statute itself” as finding no support in Auer v. Robbins.  Id. at 277. 
233 Id. at 258 (majority opinion).  
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University, it found: “That the current interpretation runs counter to the 
‘intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation’ is an additional reason 
why [Seminole Rock/]Auer deference is unwarranted.”234 
The Court’s decision in Gonzales was therefore important to the 
development of the Seminole Rock doctrine for two reasons.  First, it 
marked the return of an analysis of the agency’s stated intent at the time 
the regulation in question was promulgated when applying the Seminole 
Rock analysis.  Second, it created the “anti-parroting” exception to the 
Seminole Rock test. 
F.  Post-Gonzales (2006 to Mid-2011):  Back to Seminole Rock 
From 2006 (when Gonzales was decided) until mid-2011, the Court 
invoked the Seminole Rock doctrine eight times.235  In these cases, the 
Court cited neither Thomas Jefferson University nor Gardebring, and 
declined to scrutinize the intent of the agency at the time the regulation 
was issued.236  But the Court did consider some of the other previously 
considered factors in determining whether deference was appropriate. 
For example, in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,237 a 
unanimous Court found that two Department of Labor interpretations fell 
“well within the principle that an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulations being interpreted.”238  The Court reasoned that: 
A provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act “exempt[ed] 
from the statute’s minimum wage and maximum hours rules 
‘any employee employed in domestic service employment to 
provide companionship services for individuals who (because 
of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such 
terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the 
Secretary [of Labor]).’”239 
One Department of Labor regulation stated that “companionship” workers 
who “are employed by an employer or agency other than the family or 
                                                                                                                          
234 Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). 
235 Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139 (2011); Chase Bank USA, 
N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011); Coeur Ala., Inc. v. Se. Ala. Conservation Council, 557 
U.S. 261, 274–75 (2009); Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 295–96 
(2009); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 
U.S. 312, 328 (2008); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672 
(2007); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007).  The only opinion wherein 
the Court cited Seminole Rock instead of Auer for the Seminole Rock deference standard during this 
period was Long Island Care.  551 U.S. at 171. 
236 See cases cited supra note 235. 
237 551 U.S. 158 (2007). 
238 Id. at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
239 Id. at 161–62 (second alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2006)). 
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household using their services” fall within the statutory exemption.240  
Another regulation, however, was “inconsistent” with this exemption.241 
In affirming the agency’s interpretation, the Court noted that the 
Department “may have interpreted these regulations differently at different 
times in their history.”242  It ruled, however, that “as long as interpretive 
changes create no unfair surprise,” such a “change in interpretation alone 
presents no separate ground for disregarding the Department’s present 
interpretation.”243  The Court did, however, perform a more searching 
inquiry than it did in Auer. 
In 2008, the Court also decided Federal Express Corp. v. 
Holowecki,244 which essentially reaffirmed the Seminole Rock standard,245 
but was otherwise notable in two respects.  In a 7–2 decision, the Court 
recognized the “anti-parroting” exception established in Gonzales, but 
declined to cite Thomas Jefferson University or look to the agency’s intent 
when it promulgated the regulation at issue.246 
The case arose under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA) and required the Court to determine the meaning of the 
phrase, “a charge alleging unlawful discrimination,” which was found in 
both the ADEA and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(EEOC) implementing regulations.247 
One of the agency’s regulations defined “charge” as “a statement filed 
with the Commission by or on behalf of an aggrieved person which alleges 
that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage 
in actions in violation of the Act.”248  And another section explained the 
“five pieces of information a ‘charge should contain.’”249  The next 
                                                                                                                          
240 Id. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2006)). 
241 Id. at 168.  The Court identified the inconsistent regulation as the following: 
[T]he Department’s “General Regulation” that defines the statutory term “domestic 
service employment”. . . . says that the term covers services “of a household nature 
performed by . . . employee[s]” ranging from “maids” to “cooks” to “housekeepers” 
to “caretakers” and others, “in or about a private home . . . of the person by whom he 
or she is employed.” 
Id. (third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (emphasis omitted). 
242 Id. at 170. 
243 Id. at 170–71; see also id. (finding that “the Department’s recourse to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking in an attempt to codify its new interpretation makes any such surprise unlikely here” 
(citation omitted)). 
244 552 U.S. 389 (2008). 
245 Id. at 397. 
246 Id. at 397, 397–99 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006)). 
247 See id. at 393 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2006)) (noting also that the phrase has no statutory 
definition). 
248 Id. at 395–96 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2007)). 
249 See id. at 396 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(a)) (“[A] ‘charge should contain’: (1)-(2) the names, 
addresses, and telephone numbers of the person making the charge and the charged entity; (3) a 
statement of facts describing the alleged discriminatory act; (4) the number of employees of the 
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subsection was more permissive and suggested that a charge was 
“sufficient” if it was in writing, contained the name of alleged 
discriminator, and generally alleged the discriminatory act.250 
To resolve these ambiguities, the Court turned to the EEOC’s view of 
its regulations.  The agency opined that the regulations “identif[ed] certain 
requirements for a charge but [did] not provide an exhaustive 
definition.”251  Therefore, in its view, even though a document might meet 
the “minimal requirements” of its regulations, it did not necessarily mean it 
was a “charge.”252 
Analogizing to Chevron, the Court stated that the EEOC was entitled 
to deference “when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it 
has put in force.”253  It then cited Auer for the Seminole Rock standard: the 
Court would “accept the agency’s position unless it [was] plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”254  Adhering to the Seminole 
Rock standard, the Court accepted the agency’s position that the 
regulations were not definitive with respect to the required components of 
a “charge” and that “[a] permissible reading [was] that the regulations 
identif[ed] the procedures for filing a charge but [did] not state the full 
contents a charge document [had to] contain.”255 
Although it recognized that “charge” was a term in the underlying 
statute and that therefore the Auer anti-parroting exception might apply, 
the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether Auer applied because 
it would have upheld the agency’s interpretation under the less deferential 
standard of review set forth in Skidmore.256 
In 2009, in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & 
Investment Plan,257 the Court, in another unanimous decision, upheld the 
agencies’ interpretation as set forth in the Government’s amicus brief 
because it was neither “plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”258  Although it recognized that the agencies’ interpretation had 
“fluctuated,” it nonetheless deferred.259  The Court found that “the change 
                                                                                                                          
charged employer; and (5) a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state 
proceedings.”). 
250 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(b)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6 (“A charge shall be in writing 
and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s).  Charges 
received in person or by telephone shall be reduced to writing.”). 
251 Fed. Express Corp., 552 U.S. at 397.  Although not a party in the case, the Government 
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the EEOC.  Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Fed. Express Corp., 552 U.S. at 397. 
254 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 398–99. 
257 555 U.S. 285 (2009). 
258 Id. at 295 (alteration in original) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461). 
259 Id. at 296 n.7. 
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in interpretation alone present[ed] no separate ground for disregarding the 
[Treasury’s and the Labor] Department’s present interpretation.”260  
Furthermore, according to the Court, “the fact that the interpretation [was] 
stated in a legal brief [did not] make it unworthy of deference, as ‘[t]here is 
simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.’”261 
The Court’s opinions on agency deference from Gonzales—which 
itself may represent something of an anomaly due to its unique set of 
facts—to mid-2011262 are more difficult to characterize as a whole than 
some of the earlier decisional trends on the subject.  But, at a minimum, 
they show that the Court has more or less reverted to its original Seminole 
Rock approach. 
G.  Mid-2011 to the Present:  Seminole Rock Reconsidered? 
In June 2011, the Court released its opinion in Talk America, Inc. v. 
Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,263 in which Justice Scalia notably 
highlighted the Seminole Rock doctrine in a short concurrence.264  At issue 
in Talk America was whether local telephone service providers “must make 
certain transmission facilities available to competitors at cost-based 
rates.”265  The Court observed that “[n]o statute or regulation squarely 
addresse[d]” whether the providers were required to do so under the 
applicable statute and regulations.266  Consequently, it stated that “[i]n the 
absence of any unambiguous statute or regulation,” the Court would “turn 
to the FCC’s interpretation of its regulations.”267  And the FCC had 
interpreted its regulations to require the facilities to be made available if 
they were to be used “to link the incumbent provider’s telephone network 
                                                                                                                          
260 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 
158, 171 (2007)). 
261 Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). 
262 See Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139 (2011) (deferring under 
Auer because there was “no reason to suspect that [the agency’s] views reflect[] anything other than the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chase Bank 
USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 881 (2011) (“Under the principles set forth in Auer, we give 
deference to this interpretation.”); Coeur Ala., Inc. v. Se. Ala. Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 284 
(2009) (deferring under Auer because the interpretation “presents a reasonable interpretation of the 
regulatory regime” and therefore is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations); Nat’l 
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672 (2007) (citing the Auer standard 
and finding “that deferential standard is plainly met here”). 
263 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011). 
264 See id. at 2265–66 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing how he would reach the same holding as 
the majority without relying on the Seminole Rock doctrine, since “the FCC’s interpretation is the 
fairest reading of the orders in question”). 
265 Id. at 2257 (majority opinion). 
266 Id. at 2260. 
267 Id. at 2260–61. 
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with the competitor’s network for the mutual exchange of traffic.”268 
Although the FCC was not a party to the litigation and had merely 
appeared as amicus curiae and submitted its view in a brief, the Court 
nonetheless deferred to the agency.  Citing Auer and another recent 
decision, the Court found that deference for the agency’s interpretation was 
still appropriate “even in a legal brief, unless the interpretation [was] 
‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]’ or there [was] any 
other ‘reason to suspect that the interpretation [did] not reflect the agency’s 
fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.’”269 
In analyzing the interpretation, the Court first noted that the FCC’s 
interpretation, far from being “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation[s],” was “more than reasonable.”270  It also noted that “there 
[was] no danger that deferring to the Commission would effectively 
‘permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de 
facto a new regulation,’” and that the interpretation did not constitute “a 
post-hoc rationalization.”271  Concluding its opinion by reversing the court 
of appeals, the Court framed the decision as having relied exclusively on 
the Seminole Rock doctrine: “The FCC as amicus curiae has advanced a 
reasonable interpretation of its regulations, and we defer to its views.”272 
Although Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the Court, he wrote a 
concurring opinion specifically to highlight his newfound discomfort with 
the Seminole Rock doctrine: “For while I have in the past uncritically 
accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity.”273  
He summarized many of the criticisms set forth previously, including that 
it encourages agencies to enact vague regulations, may violate the 
separation of powers doctrine, and “frustrates the notice and predictability 
purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government.”274  
Significantly, he concluded his short concurrence by stating: “We have not 
been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case.  When we are, I will be 
receptive to doing so.”275 
Following Justice Scalia’s “shot across the bow” in Talk America, the 
Court had an opportunity to address the Seminole Rock standard in 2012 in 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.276  Although it illustrates the 
                                                                                                                          
268 Id. at 2257. 
269 Id. at 2261 (second alteration in original) (quoting Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. 
Ct. 871, 881 (2011)). 
270 Id. at 2262 (alteration in original). 
271 Id. at 2263 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)). 
272 Id. at 2265. 
273 Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Scalia referred to the Seminole Rock doctrine as “Auer 
deference.”  Id. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
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rare case where the Court declined to grant an agency Seminole Rock 
deference, the Court failed to provide a framework and precise test for 
deciding the Seminole Rock question.277  Instead, the Court reasoned that 
select past cases (some of which are not even part of the Seminole 
Rock/Auer line of cases) provided support for withholding agency 
deference.278 
In SmithKline Beecham, the Court faced the relatively straightforward 
question of “whether the term ‘outside salesman,’ as defined by 
Department of Labor (DOL or Department) regulations, encompasse[d] 
pharmaceutical sales representatives whose primary duty is to obtain 
nonbinding commitments from physicians to prescribe their employer’s 
prescription drugs in appropriate cases.”279  After discussing the 
regulations at issue and the DOL’s interpretation, the Court turned to 
whether it should defer to that interpretation.280 
The Court began by noting that “Auer ordinarily calls for deference to 
an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, even when that 
interpretation is advanced in a legal brief.” 281  But it then recognized that 
“this general rule does not apply in all cases.”282  The Court first quoted the 
Seminole Rock/Auer standard that the rule does not apply when the 
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”283  
It then cited to additional language in Auer that deference might not be 
appropriate “when there is reason to suspect that the agency’s 
interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment 
on the matter in question.’”284 
In an attempt to discern when an agency’s interpretation does not 
reflect its fair and considered judgment, the Court listed several 
examples.285  First, it “might occur when the agency’s interpretation 
conflicts with a prior interpretation.”286  This concern had been set forth in 
other cases, such as Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, and 
demonstrates the Court’s attempt to incorporate previous holdings into its 
inquiry.287  Second, the Court noted that when an agency’s interpretation 
appears to be “nothing more than a ‘convenient litigating position,’” or a 
                                                                                                                          
277 Id. at 2166–67. 
278 Id. at 2167 (referencing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 
U.S. 144, 170–71 (1991) and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) to support the 
Court’s claim that Auer deference was unnecessary).  
279 Id. at 2161. 
280 Id. at 2166. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). 
285 Id. 
286 Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)). 
287 Id. 
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‘“post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past 
agency action against attack,” then Seminole Rock deference is not due.288  
These, too, represent the Court’s acceptance of past limits on Seminole 
Rock. 
Based on these factors, the Court had no hesitation in declining to 
give the DOL’s interpretation deference under Seminole Rock.289  The 
Court found that acceptance of the DOL’s interpretation would not give 
fair warning to the public and would constitute “unfair surprise.”290  
Although acknowledging the advantages of such a highly deferential 
standard, it instead applied the less deferential Skidmore standard.291  Then, 
even when taking into account this less deferential standard, the Court was 
unable to defer to the DOL’s interpretation and “employ[ed] traditional 
tools of interpretation” to conclude that the sales representatives at issue 
were “outside salesmen” under the regulations.292 
Both Talk America and SmithKline Beecham are significant for what 
they did and did not do.  Although the Talk America majority, which 
included Justice Scalia, endorsed the Seminole Rock doctrine, Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence notably raised the issue of whether the doctrine 
should be revisited and possibly overruled by the Court.293  SmithKline 
Beecham is significant because the Court identified specific “exceptions” 
which demonstrated its acceptance that the doctrine is not unbridled.294  
And in doing so, it marked a retreat from Auer’s nearly automatic grant of 
deference to the agency.  But the Court failed to resolve the doctrinal 
concerns raised by Seminole Rock, as a general matter. 
Following in the wake of Talk America and SmithKline Beecham, the 
Seminole Rock doctrine prominently appeared in the Court’s opinions in 
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center.295  The various 
opinions—and especially the concurring opinion of Chief Justice 
Roberts—unquestionably demonstrate that the Court is prepared to re-
evaluate the doctrine in a suitable case.   
In Decker, the Court was called upon to decide whether the federal 
“Clean Water Act (CWA) and its implementing regulations require permits 
before channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads can be discharged 
into the navigable waters of the United States.”296  Under the CWA and the 
                                                                                                                          
288 Id. at 2166–67 (alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 
204, 213 (1988) and Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). 
289 Id. at 2168. 
290 Id. at 2167 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007)). 
291 Id. at 2168–69. 
292 Id. at 2170, 2172. 
293 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265–66 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
294 SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2166. 
295 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013). 
296 Id. at 1330. 
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implementing regulations issued by the EPA, a permit for such runoff is 
required if the discharge is “deemed to be ‘associated with industrial 
activity.’”297  In turn, an EPA regulation defines “the term ‘associated with 
industrial activity’ to cover only discharges ‘from any conveyance that is 
used for collecting and conveying storm water and that is directly related to 
manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial 
plant.’”298  In an amicus brief filed in the case, “[t]he EPA interprets its 
regulation to exclude the type of stormwater discharges from logging roads 
at issue.”299  Citing Auer, the Court concluded that, because the EPA’s 
determination was a “reasonable interpretation of its own regulation,” 
Seminole Rock deference would be accorded to that interpretation.300 
With respect to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation, Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, made clear that the Court “as a general 
rule, defers to it unless that interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.’”301  The Court then held that the “EPA’s 
interpretation [was] a permissible one.”302  As a separate rationale to defer 
to the EPA’s interpretation under Seminole Rock, the Court noted that 
“there is no indication that [the EPA’s] current view [was] a change from 
prior practice or a post hoc justification adopted in response to 
litigation.”303 
In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia voiced his dissatisfaction with the 
Seminole Rock doctrine.  He decried that “[e]nough is enough” with 
respect to “giving agencies the authority to say what their rules mean, 
under the harmless-sounding banner of” Seminole Rock deference.304  
Unlike in Talk America, where the “agency’s interpretation of the rule was 
also the fairest one, and no party had asked [the Court] to reconsider” the 
doctrine, Justice Scalia maintained that the application of the Seminole 
Rock doctrine in Decker “[made] the difference.”305  Furthermore, he 
asserted that the “circumstances of these cases illustrate Auer’s flaws in a 
particularly vivid way.”306 
Noting that the Court had never set forth a “persuasive justification” 
for Seminole Rock deference, Justice Scalia identified many of the 
                                                                                                                          
297 Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (2006)) 
298 Id. at 1330–31 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006)). 
299 Id. at 1331 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 24–27, 
Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338, 11-347)). 
300 Id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 
301 Id. at 1337 (citing Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 871, 881 (2011) (quoting Auer, 
519 U.S. at 461)). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166–67 (2012)). 
304 Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. 
Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
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criticisms of the doctrine set forth by scholars in academic literature and by 
Justices in past decisions.307  He concluded his criticism of the Seminole 
Rock doctrine by opining that “however great may be the efficiency gains 
derived from Auer deference, beneficial effect cannot justify a rule that not 
only has no principled basis but contravenes one of the great rules of 
separation of powers,” namely, the power of self-interpretation.308  
Accordingly, he would have resolved the meaning of the regulation in 
question by applying “familiar tools of textual interpretation” such as the 
fairest reading of the regulations.309 
But the most significant aspect of this case (with respect to the future 
development of the Seminole Rock doctrine) was the concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, which was devoted entirely 
to highlight the Court’s interest in the doctrine.310  The Chief Justice called 
special attention to Justice Scalia’s opinion, which “raise[d] serious 
questions about the principle set forth” in Seminole Rock and Auer.311  He 
acknowledged that although “[i]t may be appropriate to reconsider that 
principle in an appropriate case,” the present case was not appropriate due 
to the lack of fully-developed arguments by the parties on the doctrine.312   
But recognizing that the doctrine goes “to the heart of administrative 
law” that “arise as a matter of course on a regular basis,” he then 
specifically made the bar “aware that there is some interest in 
reconsidering those cases.”313  The Chief Justice concluded his opinion by 
stating that he “would await a case in which the issue is properly raised and 
argued.”314 
Decker, in combination with Talk America and SmithKline Beecham, 
provides the strongest evidence that the Court will agree to hear a case 
involving Seminole Rock in order to re-evaluate the doctrine.  
Consequently, it is possible that the Court could soon resolve many of the 
questions emanating from its opinions over the past sixty-eight years.  It 
remains to be seen, however, whether the Court, in re-evaluating the 
doctrine, will reject the doctrine, will take the opportunity to create a 
consistent framework or test (as exists for statutory interpretation under 
Chevron) for courts to apply when deciding whether to defer under 
                                                                                                                          
307 Id. at 1341 (quoting Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) and Anthony, supra note 21, at 11–12, and generally citing Manning, supra 
note 4). 
308 Id. at 1342. 
309 Id.  
310 Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
311 Id. (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) and Auer v. Robbins, 
519 U.S. 452 (1997)). 
312 Id. at 1338–39. 
313 Id. at 1339. 
314 Id. 
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Seminole Rock, or will simply add to the confusion by endorsing the 
doctrine without adding meaningful limits or parameters for the lower 
courts to apply.315 
V.  A NEW APPROACH 
A.  Introduction 
This Part proposes a new approach to the Seminole Rock doctrine that 
is based upon an analysis of the doctrine as it has been applied from 1945 
to the present day.  At the outset, it is worth highlighting that the Court in 
Seminole Rock did not explain its justification for giving an agency 
controlling deference for its interpretation of its regulation.  Not only does 
this raise questions as to whether the Court knew at the time that its brief 
statement concerning deference would provide the basis for a seminal 
administrative law doctrine, but the absence of an underlying rationale for 
the doctrine might also help explain the doctrine’s “slow start” with respect 
to its appearance in Supreme Court jurisprudence during the first two 
decades following the decision. 
Yet when the Court began to apply the standard more routinely 
(primarily in the 1970s through the mid-1980s), the Court’s analysis was 
often more searching than the text of the standard would have suggested 
was necessary.316  And despite the lack of explicit explanation or guidance 
in Seminole Rock as to how one might determine whether an interpretation 
was “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” the Court 
consistently looked to certain factors when deciding whether to defer.317  
Principal among these factors was an inquiry into whether the agency’s 
interpretation had been consistent over time.318  And in the short-lived rule 
announced in Gardebring v. Jenkins, the Court explained that the Seminole 
Rock standard also required courts to analyze the agency’s intent when it 
originally promulgated the regulation in question.319  Likely motivating this 
more searching inquiry into the deference question was the concern—
voiced by several members of the Court during the 1990s—that the 
Seminole Rock standard provided an agency with the incentive to issue 
                                                                                                                          
316 See supra Part IV.B. 
316 See supra Part IV.B. 
317 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (creating the anti-parroting 
exception); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (explaining that the agency had not engaged in 
post hoc rationalization, which might have undermined its entitlement to deference); Gardebring v. 
Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988) (considering the agency’s intent at the time it promulgated the 
regulation in question); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965) (emphasizing that the agency had 
consistently interpreted the order in question in opting to defer to it). 
318 N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter Cnty. Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc., 423 
U.S. 12, 15 (1975); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971); Udall, 380 U.S. at 16–17. 
319 Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 430. 
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vague regulations and “reinterpret” them whenever the need presented 
itself.320 
But after the Court’s 1997 unanimous opinion in Auer, the Court 
seemed to shy away from a meaningful inquiry into whether to defer—and 
particularly from any inquiry into the agency’s intent at the time it 
promulgated the regulation, as set forth in Thomas Jefferson University and 
Gardebring.321  Indeed, the Auer decision once again suggested that not 
much more is required than a brief look at the agency’s interpretation 
before accepting it. 
Although the Court seemed to revive the “intent” factor in Gonzales in 
2006,322 this too was short-lived.  In post-Gonzales cases, such as Long 
Island Care,323 National Association of Home Builders,324 Holowecki,325 
and Kennedy,326 the Court did not mention the agency’s intent when it 
promulgated the regulation as a relevant factor in determining whether to 
defer.  While it looked at the other various factors, the current trend, 
overall, suggests that the Court has reverted back to its original Seminole 
Rock approach. 
But Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Talk America opened the 
door to revisiting not only the contours of the doctrine, but the doctrine 
itself.327  And because the Court did not need to reconsider the doctrine as 
a whole in order to deny Seminole Rock deference to the agency at issue in 
SmithKline Beecham,328 the Court has yet to squarely address the long-
standing practical and doctrinal concerns that were resurrected by Justice 
Scalia in his Talk America and Decker opinions.  
Reflecting on the Court’s most recent pronouncements, I believe that it 
missed an important opportunity to establish a test and define the precise 
contours of the Seminole Rock doctrine in SmithKline Beecham and 
Decker.  In neglecting to do so, the Court has perpetuated the doctrinal 
inconsistency—and even confusion—set forth in its opinions over the past 
                                                                                                                          
320 See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 110–11 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“An agency is bound by the regulations it promulgates and may not attempt to circumvent the 
amendment process through substantive changes recorded in an informal policy manual that are 
unsupported by the language of the regulation.”); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 
(1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague 
regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make 
law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”). 
321 Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512; Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 512. 
322 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258. 
323 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007). 
324 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672–73 (2007). 
325 Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008). 
326 Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 295–97 (2009). 
327 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“We have not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case.  When we are, I will be receptive to 
doing so.”). 
328 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012). 
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sixty-five years.  Taken altogether, however, these sometimes-divergent 
opinions are important because many of the factors considered by the 
Court in those cases promote fairness, consistency, and accountability in 
the administrative state.  And if adopted as part of an established test for 
Seminole Rock deference, they would go a long way to allay concerns of 
unconstitutional agency “self-interpretation” and lack of an independent 
judicial check on the agency interpretation.  It is these factors that therefore 
provide the foundation for the new standard I propose below. 
B.  A New Approach to the Seminole Rock Doctrine  
Some scholars have argued, expressly or impliedly, that the Supreme 
Court should overrule Seminole Rock.329  They claim that an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations should be reviewed under the less 
deferential standard set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.330  Professors 
Robert Anthony and John Manning, for example, have extensively 
explored various practical and constitutional concerns with the Seminole 
Rock doctrine as currently applied by the Court.331 
Other scholars have reached the opposite conclusion.  Professor 
Richard Pierce, Jr. and Scott Angstreich, for example, have defended the 
Seminole Rock standard.332  They believe that the Court should reaffirm 
and retain the Seminole Rock doctrine, thereby protecting the highly 
deferential standard set forth in Chevron. 
I find neither approach entirely satisfying.  In fact, I find myself 
between a rock and a hard place when asked to choose between them.  So 
rather than surveying their arguments and ultimately choosing a side, my 
goal here is to offer a practical solution that aims to address legitimate 
criticism on both sides of the issue.  Guided by the Court’s prior opinions 
and deference analyses over sixty years, I propose a new approach.  This 
approach does not wholly reject or accept Seminole Rock deference and 
instead represents an intermediate level of deference that essentially 
combines features of the current controlling deference standards, including 
Seminole Rock and Chevron, with the less deferential standard of 
Skidmore. 
The standard continues to value the expertise and experience that an 
agency brings to the table when determining the meaning of a regulation.  
                                                                                                                          
329 Manning, supra note 4, at 618; see also Anthony, supra note 21, at 9–10 (indicating that the 
Supreme Court should not let agencies judge their own regulations).  Justices on the Supreme Court 
have likewise expressed concern with the doctrine.  E.g., Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2265–66 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Shalala v. Guernesey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108, 110–11 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). 
330 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
331 Anthony, supra note 21, at 4–8; Manning, supra note 4, at 618. 
332 Angstreich, supra note 4, at 112; Pierce, supra note 11, at 569–72. 
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And while it allows the agency’s proffered interpretation to remain the 
focal point, it also ensures that the judiciary will play a more prominent 
and independent role when reviewing the underlying regulation than under 
the current Seminole Rock standard.  It accomplishes this important goal by 
incorporating objective criteria into the analysis to determine whether to 
defer. 
But the test does not go so far as to include a key feature of the 
Skidmore standard: its reliance on the “persuasiveness” as the “ultimate 
touchstone for deference.”333  By eschewing such a factor, a court’s ability 
to substitute its own policy judgment for that of the agency will be more 
limited.  While this may not entirely satisfy some critics, such as Professor 
Manning, who believe that a court must have “an independent judicial 
check,” it nonetheless should satisfy their view that “it is crucial to have 
some meaningful external check upon the power of the agency to 
determine the meaning of the laws that it writes.”334 
And while I recognize that these scholars may believe that it would be 
prudent to replace the Seminole Rock standard with Skidmore’s test, I find 
it to be unrealistic for both pragmatic and doctrinal reasons.  As a 
pragmatic matter, the Court has reaffirmed the Seminole Rock doctrine as 
recently as the 2012 Term and it seems extremely unlikely to sweep away 
so many years of adherence to the doctrine now.  As a doctrinal matter, the 
modification that I propose will remain faithful to Seminole Rock’s core 
holding,335 thereby avoiding the need to overrule the case directly. 
I also acknowledge the many advantages to retaining and reaffirming 
Seminole Rock in its current form.  For example, it would enable agencies 
to streamline policy changes (especially when leadership in the Executive 
Branch changes) and to “shore up” Chevron.336  I ultimately believe that, 
on balance, a change of the current standard would better effectuate 
consistency, transparency, and accountability in the administrative state, 
including the potential to “enhance the efficacy of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, improve regulated parties’ ability to conform their conduct to 
the law’s requirements, and provide the legal community a firmer 
benchmark against which to measure and control arbitrary conduct by 
                                                                                                                          
333 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 53, at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
334 Manning, supra note 4, at 618, 682. 
335 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
336 Angstreich, supra note 4, at 58; see also Pierce, supra note 11, at 604 (arguing that overruling 
Seminole Rock would “exacerbat[e] the problem of delay between the time a President is elected and 
the time when the courts will allow his policy preferences to replace those of his predecessor”).  
Professor Pierce, however, suggests several modest improvements to the doctrine, including two 
suggestions that are addressed in the test proposed here: (1) whether the agency’s interpretation is 
merely a “litigating position”; and (2) whether the “antiparroting exception” to Seminole Rock 
deference applies.  Id. at 605–06. 
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officials in the field.”337 
The formulation of the Seminole Rock standard that I advance 
essentially incorporates the following three key elements: (1) the core 
holding of the decision itself—namely, that deference to an administrative 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is warranted unless the 
interpretation “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”; 
(2) features relied upon by the Court in other deference regimes, such as 
Chevron; and (3) factors from the Court’s previous decisions applying 
Seminole Rock doctrine. 
The new deference approach for courts is divided into a two-step 
test.338  As in Chevron, when faced with an agency’s interpretation of its 
regulation, the first step would be to determine whether the regulation is 
ambiguous.  If ambiguous, the second step would be to apply four 
objective factors to the deference questions.339  These factors are: (1) the 
administrative agency’s stated intent at the time of the regulation’s 
promulgation; (2) whether the interpretation currently advanced has been 
consistently held; (3) in what format the interpretation appears; and (4) 
whether the regulation merely restates or “parrots” the statutory language.  
The analysis of these factors would determine whether or not the agency 
would be entitled to controlling deference under Seminole Rock. 
1.  Step One of the New Seminole Rock Test 
As in Chevron, a court would determine whether to grant Seminole 
Rock deference using a two-step test.340  In Chevron’s familiar two-step 
test, a court first looks to whether Congress has directly spoken on the 
question at issue.341  If Congress has, the court’s inquiry is at an end.342  
However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court determines 
whether the agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.”343  If permissible, the interpretation is controlling.344 
When assessing an agency’s interpretation of a regulation, a similar 
first step would ask whether the regulation at issue is ambiguous.  If there 
is no ambiguity, the reviewing court need not consider the agency’s 
                                                                                                                          
337 Manning, supra note 4, at 685; see id. (explaining why it would be advantageous to adopt 
“structural incentives for agencies to draft clearer regulations”). 
338 Just as Chevron applies only when an agency is interpreting a statute that it has been granted 
the authority to administer, so too does this test apply only when an agency is interpreting a regulation 
it administers.  If the agency were interpreting a regulation that it does not administer, a court generally 
would apply the Skidmore test. 
339 As discussed infra Part V.B.2.a, these factors give meaning to the aspect of the Seminole Rock 
standard that precludes deference if the interpretation is “inconsistent with the regulation.” 
340 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
341 Id. at 842.  
342 Id. at 842–43. 
343 Id. at 843.  
344 Id. at 843–44.  
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interpretation and would enforce the plain language of the regulation.345  If 
the court finds that the regulation is ambiguous, it should then proceed to 
the multifactor inquiry set forth below to decide whether the agency’s 
interpretation satisfies the other prong of the Seminole Rock formulation, 
specifically, whether it is “inconsistent with the regulation.”346 
As an initial matter, the use of a two-step test should come as no 
surprise to those who have looked closely at the doctrine.347  And it should 
not raise any serious objections.  An agency simply cannot prevail (under 
any deference regime) if it proffers an interpretation that directly conflicts 
with the plain language of the regulation.  As stated by the Court in 
Christensen, deference in that situation would “permit the agency, under 
the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new 
regulation.”348    
The adoption of such a step also has direct support from the Seminole 
Rock decision itself.  The Court prefaced its statement that the agency’s 
interpretation must be accepted unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation” by noting that the agency’s interpretation of the 
regulation was only relevant “if the meaning of the works used [in the 
regulation was] in doubt.”349  In addition, it may well be that any agency 
interpretation that conflicts with plain language of the regulation, by 
definition, “is plainly erroneous.”350 
2.  Step Two of the New Seminole Rock Test 
Step two of the new Seminole Rock test would look to four objective 
factors to determine whether to grant controlling deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulation.  Unlike Skidmore, where courts subjectively 
weigh the “persuasiveness” of the agency’s explanation, courts applying 
this test would mechanically analyze: (1) the stated intent and/or 
interpretation of the agency (if it exists) when the agency promulgated the 
                                                                                                                          
345 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (asserting that there was no 
ambiguity in the law and, therefore, the analysis should focus on the “plain words of the regulation”). 
346 Id. 
347 See Angstreich, supra note 4, at 70–71 (noting that Seminole Rock doctrine would be better 
expressed as a two-step process). 
348 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); see also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l 
Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 110 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“An agency is bound by the regulations it 
promulgates . . . .”).  
349 Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414. 
350 As discussed in Part III, although the Supreme Court rarely explicitly mentioned this inquiry 
when determining whether to grant Seminole Rock deference, it was abundantly clear from the context 
of those opinions that the regulation at issue was ambiguous.  In any event, in Gardebring v. Jenkins, 
the Court clearly articulated the Seminole Rock standard as requiring deference unless an alternate 
interpretation is “compelled by the regulation’s plain language.” 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988).  Likewise, 
in Christensen v. Harris County—nearly fifty-five years after the Seminole Rock decision—the Court 
explicitly reaffirmed that “deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is 
ambiguous.” 529 U.S. at 588. 
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regulation at issue; (2) whether the agency’s interpretation has been 
consistent over time; (3) the format in which the agency offers its 
interpretation; and (4) whether the regulation in question merely repeated 
the statutory language. 
a.  Stated Intent of the Agency at the Time It Promulgated the 
Regulation 
When determining whether an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
regulation should be granted controlling deference, courts would begin by 
looking to whether the agency expressed a contrary intent when it 
originally promulgated the regulation in question.  For example, courts 
should understandably be wary of deferring to the new interpretation if the 
agency had explained in a preamble to a final rule how a particular 
regulation would function, set forth a contrary interpretation upon 
promulgation, or issued a statement contemporaneously with the 
regulation. 
Not only does the consideration of an agency’s intent when it 
promulgated the regulation at issue “most closely approximate[] the 
Supreme Court’s announced guidance,” it provides a necessary check on 
an agency’s discretion.351  If the intent of the agency is defined at the time 
a regulation is issued, the public is entitled to rely upon that interpretation 
when deciding how to act or conduct its business.  Indeed, the method for 
an agency to create legal obligations by enacting regulations is to engage in 
notice and comment rulemaking under the APA.  As its name suggests, this 
administrative process gives notice to the public and generally provides for 
an opportunity to submit comments on the rule before it is finalized.352  
Because “[t]raditional concepts of due process [are] incorporated into 
administrative law,” proper APA rulemaking therefore enforces both 
equitable principles of fair notice and constitutional due process 
concerns.353  Incorporating an analysis of the agency’s stated intent in 
deciding whether to defer to its proffered interpretation therefore reinforces 
this safeguard. 
Limiting an agency from deviating from its stated intent when it 
promulgated the regulation at issue likewise would also help bring the 
Seminole Rock doctrine in line with the related and prevailing view that 
post-enactment statements by Congress on prior legislation are suspect.  As 
                                                                                                                          
351 Noah, supra note 6, at 291–92.  
352 See Thomas L. Casey, III, Towards Function and Fair Notice: Two Models for Effecting 
Executive Policy Through Changing Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes and Rules, 2008 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 725, 738–40 (providing an overview of APA rulemaking process requirements). 
353 Id. at 757 (quoting Satellite Broad Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  As Mr. Casey points out, some courts have “incorporated broader equitable 
considerations into its fair notice analysis” beyond “purely . . . constitutional due process 
requirements.”  Id. at 758.  
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Professor Lars Noah succinctly and astutely point outs: “Ironically, when 
interpreting regulations, courts appear to give the most credence to post-
promulgation expressions of agency intent, precisely the converse of the 
view that post-enactment expressions of legislative intent deserve little if 
any weight.”354 
Looking to the agency’s stated intent also draws support from several 
of the Court’s more recent opinions applying the doctrine.  For example, in 
Gardebring v. Jenkins, seven Justices (including two in dissent) endorsed 
the proposition that the applicable legal test and view holds that the Court 
is “properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the [agency’s] 
unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain 
language or by other indications of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the 
regulation’s promulgation.”355  And in Thomas Jefferson University v. 
Shalala, the Court likewise explained that the Seminole Rock standard 
required an analysis as to whether an alternative interpretation was 
compelled by indications of the agency’s “intent at the time of the 
regulation’s promulgation.”356  Finally, in 2006, the Court in Gonzales v. 
Oregon relied on its finding that because the current interpretation ran 
counter to the “intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation,” 
Seminole Rock deference was unwarranted.357 
Moreover, as set forth in more detail immediately below, the 
consistency of an agency’s position is the next factor in the test proposed 
here.  Determining the stated intent of the agency at the time of the 
regulation’s promulgation therefore provides a needed baseline for 
determining whether the agency’s position has, in fact, been consistent 
over time. 
b.  Whether an Agency’s Interpretation of Its Regulation Is 
Consistent with Prior Interpretations  
Next, courts should consider whether the proffered agency 
interpretation is consistent with prior interpretations by the agency.  This 
factor provides an important check against newly minted agency 
interpretations that are not a result of reasoned decision making.  Looking 
to the agency’s consistency would effectively provide a disincentive for 
agencies to hastily change an interpretation, most likely through an 
                                                                                                                          
354 Noah, supra note 6, at 284. 
355 485 U.S. 415, 430, 432 (1988) (emphasis added). 
356 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 430) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In addition, Justice Marshall’s dissent in Mullins Coal would have rejected the agency’s 
interpretation in that case, in part, because it conflicted with “comments of the Secretary accompanying 
the final promulgation of the regulations . . . .”  Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 166 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
357 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 
512 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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informal manner. 
As a theoretical matter, as Professors Michael Asimow and Robert A. 
Anthony point out, changed interpretations do not warrant deference 
because most, if not all, of the justifications for giving an agency deference 
are simply not present when a new or changed interpretation is: (1) not 
consistent with earlier ones; (2) unlikely to be a long-standing 
interpretation; (3) not adopted contemporaneously with the regulation; (4) 
not adopted with public participation; and/or (5) more likely to disturb 
reliance interests.358  Thus, they argue, a court should be “free to address 
the interpretive issue with judicial neutrality” and it is “in a clear position 
to determine its own interpretation of the agency regulation.”359 
For this reason, “[o]f all the Skidmore factors, consistency seems most 
widely used.”360  Insisting upon consistency as an express factor thereby 
“directs courts to give weight to interpretations that have not changed over 
time, affording longstanding administrative interpretations respect, in part, 
simply because they are long-standing.”361 
Consideration of consistency also reinforces related principles 
articulated by the Court that ensure sound agency decision making and 
governmental transparency.  For example, in Thomas Jefferson University 
v. Shalala, the Court acknowledged that “it is true that an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior 
interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently 
held agency view.”362  The Court has also suggested that when an agency 
                                                                                                                          
358 Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A Second Opinion?  Inconsistent Interpretive Rules, 
25 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2000, at 16, 16. 
359 Id.  Professors Asimow and Anthony note, however, that: 
An agency interpretation should of course be accorded the consideration that the 
agency’s specialized work may warrant.  Very often—probably in the great majority 
of cases—the court’s independently arrived-at interpretation will concur with that of 
the agency.  But that outcome should be the result of the court’s own free decision, 
not of some mechanistic deference to an informal agency position not promulgated 
by notice and comment or otherwise pursuant to delegated lawmaking authority. 
Id. at 16–17. 
360 Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of 
Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1144 (2001); see also Ellen P. Aprill, Theories of Statutory 
Interpretation: The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2113 (2005) (discussing Skidmore’s 
reliance on consistency). 
361 Aprill, supra note 360, at 2113; see N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 
(1982) (stating that an agency’s own longstanding interpretation ought to be given “particular 
deference”). 
362 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)).  Other cases 
involving Seminole Rock deference reinforce the view that the consistency of the agency’s 
interpretation has been an important factor.  For example, in one of the first cases applying the 
Seminole Rock doctrine, Udall v. Tallman, the Court noted that the agency had consistently construed 
the orders at issue.  380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965).  Likewise, six years later in Ehlert v. United States, the 
Court cited Seminole Rock when it stated that it was “obligated to regard as controlling a reasonable, 
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changes its view, it has an affirmative duty “to explain its departure from 
prior norms.”363 
In the 2012 SmithKline Beecham decision, the Court stated that 
Seminole Rock deference might not be appropriate “when the agency’s 
interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation.”364  Indeed, the Court 
has explicitly held that “the consistency of an agency’s position is a factor 
in assessing the weight that position is due.”365 
Of course, there can be good reasons for an agency to change its 
interpretation and for allowing them broad leeway to do so.  The agency 
should be prepared, however, to justify that decision, particularly if it 
elects to forego a notice and comment procedure.  At bottom, consistency 
is a key component of any functioning administrative system; if an agency 
abdicates its responsibility to guard, and even promote, this principle, 
courts should not be hesitant to do so.366 
Finally, acknowledgment that an agency’s interpretation has remained 
unchanged fosters, as one scholar notes, “a kind of stare decisis in order to 
merit judicial deference.”367  By putting agencies on notice that courts will 
look to the consistency of the agency’s interpretation, agencies will 
consequently be less likely to reinterpret their regulation without careful 
consideration that a court might reject that new interpretation.  This factor 
would thus benefit both the public and the agency itself in its decision-
making process. 
c.  The Format by Which the Agency Expresses Its Interpretation 
The next factor a court would examine is the format of the agency’s 
interpretation.  As Professor Anthony has observed, an agency’s 
interpretation generally can be expressed in numerous forms.368 
To the extent an agency’s interpretation of a regulation is expressed 
formally (e.g., through a notice and comment procedure), this factor would 
clearly militate in favor of deference to that interpretation.  In fact, aware 
of the importance of this consideration to whether it will receive deference, 
an agency would have the opportunity to take steps to express the 
interpretation in the most formal, practicable manner.  This would promote 
transparency in the administrative state because, for the most part, the 
                                                                                                                          
consistently applied administrative interpretation.”  402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971). 
363 Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe R.R. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973). 
364 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012). 
365 Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993). 
366 Although hers was not the prevailing view, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Gardebring v. 
Jenkins explained that she would have rejected an agency’s interpretation under the Seminole Rock 
standard because the agency had taken “two inconsistent positions” during the litigation.  485 U.S. 415, 
432–33 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
367 Aprill, supra note 360, at 2113. 
368 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
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more formal the format of an interpretation, the more likely the agency will 
have engaged in a thorough analysis of its interpretation.  For instance, 
unlike an interpretation set forth in an amicus brief (or for the first time 
during an adjudication), formal documents, such as guidance manuals and 
policy statements, are more likely to set forth a complete, reasoned, and 
deliberate interpretation, even though they were not developed through 
notice and comment procedures. 
There are, of course, many more ways interpretations can be expressed 
informally by an agency.  And while it is unrealistic (and ill-advised) to 
assess and compare the relative weight of each format here, one format is 
worthy of mention.  There is reason to suggest that courts should be wary 
of deferring to agency interpretations that have been asserted during 
litigation and especially those submitted through an amicus brief.  By their 
nature, these litigation positions generally do not carry with them the 
weight and judgment typically associated with agency interpretations 
expressed in other informal formats, and therefore should be entitled to less 
weight during juridical review of the deference question. 
For example, the Court in SmithKline Beecham reaffirmed its view 
originally set forth in Bowen that it would refuse to defer interpretations 
that were mere post hoc rationalizations by the agency.369  In particular, the 
Court warned that “[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an 
agency’s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.”370  
Relatedly, the consideration of this factor would help ensure that the 
interpretation reflects “the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the 
matter in question.”371  And a prime indicator of whether an interpretation 
is an agency’s “fair and considered judgment” would include the format by 
which the agency sets forth its interpretation.372  Thus, a renewed and more 
meaningful consideration of whether an agency’s view is a mere litigating 
position or post hoc rationalization would lead to more reasoned 
                                                                                                                          
369 SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2166; Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 
212 (1988).  I recognize that the Court would have to retreat from its view that briefs, such as amicus 
briefs, that set forth an interpretation for the very first time, should receive Seminole Rock deference.  
See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 881 (2011) (deferring to an interpretation 
presented in an amicus brief when there is no reason to scrutinize the brief as a “post hoc 
rationalization”). 
370 Bowen, 488 U.S. at 213. 
371 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); see also Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. 
& Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 296 n.7 (2009) (rejecting the notion that “the fact that the interpretation is 
stated in a legal brief make[s] it unworthy of deference”). 
372 Therefore, an analysis of the format also dovetails with an analysis of the consistency of the 
agency’s interpretation.  For instance, a district court has noted that “[a]n agency may revise or alter its 
interpretation over time, but this revised interpretation may be entitled to less deference than a position 
consistently held, particularly when the agency does not provide a reasoned analysis for the revision.”  
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:05-0784, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97432, 
at *32 (S.D. W. Va. June 13, 2007) (citing Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 
(1993)). 
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interpretations. 
This is not to say that the agency cannot issue an interpretation without 
going through a notice and comment process.373  If the agency does not do 
so, it may utilize the “interpretative rules” exemption found in section 553 
of the APA.374  By proceeding in this manner, the interpretation would not 
be subject to more involved APA procedures.  At the same time, however, 
the agency’s interpretation would be subject to increased scrutiny by the 
court.375 
d.  Whether the Regulation Merely Repeats Statutory Language 
The final factor that courts would consider is whether the regulation 
that the agency purports to interpret merely restates or “parrots” the 
statutory language.  In these instances, the agency’s proffered 
interpretation is not actually an interpretation of the regulation.  Rather, it 
is actually the agency’s interpretation of the statutory language. 
In light of the recent decisions in Mead and Christensen, there is a 
legitimate concern that the agency might attempt to use its interpretation of 
its regulation as a subterfuge for interpreting the statute to gain a more 
deferential standard.  Under these decisions, informal interpretations of 
statutes are no longer interpreted under Chevron’s highly deferential 
standard.376  Instead, they are to be reviewed under Skidmore’s less 
deferential standard.  An agency thus could gain a “deferential advantage” 
if it were to succeed in having its informal interpretation of a regulation 
that mirrors the statutory language reviewed under Seminole Rock, rather 
than Skidmore.377  Following the general maxim that “what cannot be done 
                                                                                                                          
373 See Asimow & Anthony, supra note 358, at 17 (“[A] changed agency interpretation of a 
regulation need not be promulgated by notice and comment, but can be attacked for failure to supply an 
adequate explanation or on grounds of incorrectness.”). 
374 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
375 As Professors Asimow and Anthony persuasively argue: 
The agency should bear responsibility for the clarity of its regulations, which are 
legislative acts objectively put forth for all to see and to interpret by their lights.  An 
agency interpretation should of course get fair judicial consideration.  But a private 
party ought to be able to derive its own interpretation and argue it to the court, 
without being automatically trumped by the agency’s (often self-serving) 
interpretation. 
Asimow & Anthony, supra note 358, at 17.  This would ensure consistency with the “[t]he manifest 
purpose of APA § 706, which mandates that ‘the reviewing court . . . shall determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action,’ is to give affected persons recourse to an independent 
judicial interpreter.”  Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)). 
376 See cases cited supra note 90. 
377 See Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 11 (“Canny agency counsel might evade 
Christensen’s rule denying strong deference to informal agency interpretations of statutes, by crafting 
informal interpretive documents that purport to interpret regulations rather than the governing statute.  
In this way an informally-issued agency position could command deference under Auer-Seminole Rock 
where it could not get deference under Chevron.”).  Indeed, that is precisely what the United States 
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directly also cannot be done indirectly,” when a court concludes that a 
regulation is merely “parroting” the statutory language, it should decline to 
apply Seminole Rock deference to the agency’s interpretation. 
Irrespective of an agency’s attempt to game the system, more 
fundamentally, as the Court observed in Gonzales v. Oregon, “[a]n agency 
does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead 
of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has 
elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”378  Inclusion of this 
factor in this new approach would therefore screen out those situations and 
have the added benefit of bringing some consistency to this area of law. 
C.  Applying the New Approach  
With these factors in place, the question remains how to apply the 
approach in practice.  Although I do not propose a specific method for 
making the final determination, such as weighing one factor more than 
another, it should be fairly apparent whether a court should defer to the 
agency’s interpretation once each factor is explored. 
To be sure, this ultimate balancing of the factors does require, to some 
degree, a subjective determination of whether to accept an agency’s 
interpretation.  But such subjectivity is present even in highly deferential 
standards such as Chevron’s controlling deference test.  For example, in 
Chevron, courts must determine whether the statutory language is 
ambiguous and then whether the interpretation is “reasonable.”379 
Any subjectivity inherent in the test proposed above is far less 
subjective than Skidmore’s test.  For instance, contrary to Skidmore, the 
factors of the proposed test do not call for a weighing of the merits of the 
agency’s interpretation.  Under Skidmore, courts weigh an interpretation 
according to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”380  Principal among these is the court’s assessment of the 
“validity” of the agency’s interpretation.  Therefore, despite the presence 
of the other factors, the determination of whether to defer often rests on 
whether the court subjectively believes that the agency’s view is valid. 
Viewed in this light, an analysis of the factors proposed above allows 
much less room for variation because, as a general matter, each of the 
                                                                                                                          
attempted to do in Christensen.  Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); see also 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (“The Government first argues that the Interpretive Rule 
is an elaboration of one of the Attorney General’s own regulations . . . . [and therefore] is entitled to 
considerable deference in accordance with Auer.”). 
378 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 244. 
379 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).   
380 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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factors calls for an objective answer.  For instance, most of them often call 
for a simple “yes” or “no” answer: Did the agency state a contrary intent 
that it is proposing now?  Does the current interpretation conflict with its 
past interpretation?  Does the regulation merely parrot the statutory 
language?  Although a court is left to determine whether the factors compel 
the conclusion that it should accept the agency’s interpretation, such a 
determination mostly weighs on objective criteria.381 
Therefore, by relying upon objective factors, thereby limiting the 
subjective inquiry, and erring in a sense to deference, the new approach 
proposed herein falls comfortably between Chevron’s controlling 
deference and Skidmore’s less deferential treatment that the courts apply 
when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision.  Such 
an approach would enable the Court to refine the deference regime to 
achieve better workability, greater fairness, transparency, and increased 
public participation, without overruling the Seminole Rock decision 
altogether.  It would also “respect the agency’s expertise, but preserve[] for 
the courts their traditional power of interpretation where the agency has not 
promulgated its position by exercise of delegated legislative power.”382 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the end, I believe adoption of this new approach will be effective at 
taking the courts, the public, and administrative agencies out from their 
respective “rock and a hard place.”383  Courts, for instance, have been 
understandably hesitant to give controlling deference to agencies (e.g., 
Seminole Rock and Chevron) in interpretive cases because it may constitute 
an abdication of the judicial role.  On the other hand, courts have also been 
concerned about withholding the proper amount of deference agencies 
                                                                                                                          
381 Even the factor that calls for courts to look at the format by which the interpretation is set forth 
can be viewed objectively.  As noted above, an interpretation expressed in myriad ways: manuals, court 
briefs, interpretive rules, policy statements, opinion letters, correspondence, guidelines, press releases, 
testimony before Congress, internal memoranda, speeches, the preamble of the final rule.  These can be 
generally classified according to their indicia of reliability.  See supra Part V.B.2.c. 
382 Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 21. 
383 I use the phrase “between a rock and a hard place” to represent a dilemma or position where 
there are two largely unsatisfactory choices.  Although this term is believed to have originated in the 
United States, it is closely related to the Greek mythological choice sailors had to face when navigating 
a course that would bring them into close proximity to two sea monsters, Scylla and Charybdis.  As 
described by Homer in The Odyssey, avoiding one meant approaching too closely to the other, with 
either option having dire consequences.  HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 274–75 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin 
Books 1996).  The earliest known printed reference in the U.S. is reported to be in the “Dialect Notes 
V” published by the American Dialect Society in 1921.  Between a Rock and a Hard Place, KNOW 
YOUR PHRASE, http://www.knowyourphrase.com/phrase-meanings/Between-Rock-and-Hard-
Place.html (last visited on Aug. 25, 2013).  Some suggest that it stems from the illegal “Bisbee 
Deportations incident of 1917” in which miners at the Copper Queen Mining Company in Bisbee, 
Arizona, were forced to choose between harsh labor conditions (at the rock-face) or deportation and 
likely unemployment and poverty (a hard place).  Id. 
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deserve (e.g., Skidmore) because doing so may improperly shift the 
regulatory burden and policy-making choices to the courts.  Given the 
uncertainty in this area of the law generally, and the doctrinal confusion 
with respect to Seminole Rock specifically, agencies, for their part, are 
often caught between deciding whether to interpret a regulation informally, 
or engage in a more costly and time consuming procedure involving the 
notice and comment procedure of the APA.  It thus seems clear that both 
agencies and courts would benefit from a clearly articulated and more 
balanced standard to look to when undertaking their respective roles in the 
legal and administrative processes. 
And the same can be said with respect to the public, and, by extension, 
regulated industries.  With this new approach, an administrative agency 
would have a diminished incentive to promulgate vague regulations 
(thereby limiting its broad leeway to interpret them in the future), and a 
diminished opportunity to re-interpret a regulation routinely without 
adequate notice.  The new approach outlined herein would promote much-
needed certainty for the public.  At the same time, it would protect some of 
the much-needed deference and flexibility that the public expects to be 
given to the expert and experienced administrative agency responsible for 
administering the statute.  The approach consequently has the effect of 
freeing the public and industry from facing two unsatisfactory scenarios—
too much deference to the agency, creating regulatory uncertainty, and too 
little deference, creating administrative inflexibility. 
